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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I examine how the Secret Committee of Six, a group of radical 
abolitionists who funded John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry in 1859, defined their role 
in the greater movement for black emancipation. I present a before-and-after picture of 
the guiding principles and motivations that drove these six men. Although there is 
significant scholarship concerning John Brown, there has been little discussion about the 
Secret Six, who provided him with funds and moral support and who shared his 
conviction that slavery would die by the sword. Thus, I decided to look at how the raid 
affected the individuals closest to this enigmatic veteran of Bleeding Kansas.
My first chapter lays the framework by discussing the beginnings of abolitionism 
and how it developed a sense of urgency on behalf of the enslaved. I then tie in the 
Secret Six, demonstrating their role in the abolitionist movement and their growing 
acceptance of violent means. I move on from there to a discussion of the raid at Harper’s 
Ferry and public reactions to the practical implementation of militant abolitionism, 
including how the Secret Six responded to the raid’s failure and Brown’s hanging. 
Finally, I address how most of the Six continued in the cause through the Civil War.
I conclude that the Six perceived their role in abolitionism differently after the 
raid. Before the incident at Harper’s Ferry, all of the Six were active in the abolitionist 
movement, and for the most part they remained active in the years after the raid. After 
1859, however, the nature of sectional relations had been altered so dramatically that 
abolitionists had to adjust their thinking. Thus, the Six began to see their role in the 
movement in a new light. Furthermore, I argue that the Six did not change their attitudes 
toward militant abolitionism—but, now that they had seen the far-reaching consequences 
of violence, they were less comfortable with its use. Still, none of them denied that 
violence was indeed necessary for the downfall of the slave system.
vii
TREASONOUS PATRIOTS
INTRODUCTION
“The only question is, w hether it [s la ve ry ] shall die a  peacefu l or a vio len t death—w hether it 
sh a ll qu ietly recede before advancing truth, o r  resist unto blood. " G errit Smith, 1854
“My call here has met with a most hearty response,” wrote John Brown, “so that I 
feel assured of at least tolerable success. I ought to be thankful for this. All has been 
effected by a quiet meeting of a few choice friends.”1 In a Boston hotel room on March 
4, 1858, Brown had outlined his plans for insurrection to a gathering of Massachusetts 
abolitionists who, along with a colleague from New York, would henceforth call 
themselves the Secret Committee of Six. These men pledged to support Brown’s 
proposed raid on the slaveholding South that eventually took place at Harper’s Ferry, 
Virginia, in 1859. Although these six individuals—George Steams, Samuel Howe, 
Thomas Higginson, Gerrit Smith, Franklin Sanbom, and Theodore Parker—hailed from 
different backgrounds and vocations, they were united in their admiration for the 
weathered veteran of Bleeding Kansas who would soon be immortalized as an American 
legend.
Each of the Six contributed his own perspective and resources to the abolitionist 
cause. George Luther Steams was an affluent businessman, involved in manufacturing
1 F[ranklin] B. Sanbom, The Life and Letters o f John Brown, Liberator o f Kansas, and Martyr o f  Virginia 
(1885; repr., New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 440.
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(Reprinted from Oswald Garrison Villard, John Brown, 1800-1859: A Biography Fifty 
Years After, rev. ed. [New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1943])
4lead pipes, who had a reputation for being methodical and sensible. Gerrit Smith, also a 
businessman, was one of the wealthiest landholders in the United States and a close 
friend of Frederick Douglass. Smith was the only member of the Six who lived in New 
York State; the others resided in the Boston area. Samuel Gridley Howe, a doctor who 
served during the Greek Revolution, had been imprisoned for seven months in a Prussian 
jail, an event which led to bouts of paranoia.2 His colleagues noted that he tended to be 
strong-willed and impatient. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, also considered radical and 
hot-headed, worked actively for both abolition and women’s rights and served as a 
Unitarian minister in Worcester, Massachusetts. Theodore Parker, another Unitarian 
minister, wrote numerous tracts and sermons on the evils of the slave system. The 
youngest of the group, Franklin Sanbom, was a Concord schoolteacher who counted 
Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau among his friends.3 These Six men— 
ministers, businessmen, and a teacher—had little in common outside of abolitionism.
Yet, although their individuality may have prevented consensus on every issue, they 
agreed that the Southern system of human bondage must end.
The Six came to accept violence as the only truly effective tool for combating 
slavery. They agreed that peaceful means could still be useful, but, as Gerrit Smith put it 
succinctly, “the hot purpose of the South to maintain and extend slavery can be quenched 
only in blood.”4 By the 1850s, the Six deemed political abolitionism “an experiment, 
serving its purpose perhaps in providing a medium through which the anti-slavery forces
2 Jeffery Rossbach, Ambivalent Conspirators: John Brown, The Secret Six, and a Theory o f Slave Violence 
(Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 57, 92, 26.
3 Edward J. Renahan, Jr., The Secret Six: The True Tale o f the Men Who Conspired with John Brown (New 
York: Crown Publishers, 1995), 56, 41, 2. This book provides excellent biographies o f  the Six, with the 
first four chapters dealing with Gerrit Smith, John Brown, Samuel Howe, and Theodore Parker 
respectively. The others are included in later chapters.
4 Gerrit Smith to William Goodell, August 15, 1856, quoted in Ralph Volney Harlow, Gerrit Smith: 
Philanthropist and Reformer (New York: Henry Holt, 1939), 364.
5could work for a time, but ineffective in bringing about the freedom of the slaves.”5 The 
time for peaceful resistance had passed.
Scholars often describe the Secret Six as “militant abolitionists” or “radical 
abolitionists,” terms that appear frequently in this work as well. But what makes an 
abolitionist “radical”? Historian Gerald Sorin writes that all abolitionists were radicals 
because “they recognized that nothing short o f a restructuring of American society would 
uproot slavery and racial injustice.”6 He does, however, qualify this statement and de- 
emphasize their radicalism, arguing that white abolitionists’ paternalistic attitudes, 
middle-class economic values, and imperfect understanding of class divisions hindered 
the development of radical tendencies. These characteristics, which Sorin uses to temper 
his earlier statement, are crucial: they provide a point of contrast allowing us to 
distinguish between radical abolitionists and their less radical counterparts.7 While many 
mainstream abolitionists fit Sorin’s description, I would argue that most radical 
abolitionists, including the Secret Six, do not fit this mold of mainstream abolitionism. 
Thus, I use the term “radical abolitionist” to designate those who departed from the 
standard—those who did understand class divisions, who did not have paternalistic 
attitudes, and who were forward-thinking individuals of their time.
5 Harlow, Gerrit Smith, 192. Political and non-violent abolitionists are not the subject o f this work, but 
they will surface periodically in the following chapters. For further reading on this topic, see Aileen S. 
Kraditor, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics on Strategy and Tactics, 
1834-1850 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969).
6 Gerald Sorin, Abolitionism: A New Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 19. I agree with 
Sorin that, in a certain light, all abolitionists could be called radical. Herbert Aptheker’s Abolitionism: A 
Revolutionary Movement (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989) supports this idea. He writes that “the 
movement as a whole was a revolutionary one in every respect’’(xi). Aptheker also refers to Lewis Perry, 
who argues that “to attack slavery was inescapably to call for extensive social change” (xii).
7 I acknowledge that there are many ways to characterize radical abolitionists— including certain traits and 
excluding others. However, Sorin’s distinctions hit at the core issues and thus serve as an excellent guide.
6I would also categorize as a subsection of radicalism, “militant” or “violent” 
abolitionism, signifying those who accepted peaceful methods but agreed that violence 
was also necessary for the downfall of the slave system, According to Michael Fellman, 
radical abolitionists divided into two factions—non-resistant radicals and militant 
abolitionists—over the issue of violent means.8 Militant abolitionists ranged from those 
who only condoned violence in the name of self-defense to those who supported slave 
insurrection, or any combination between these extremes. Militant abolitionists drew 
from the ranks of radical abolitionists, and it is within this subsection that I place the 
Secret Six.
Other historians also agree that the Six fell within the category of militant 
abolitionists, yet there are no studies focusing specifically on how they adapted their 
attitudes toward violence and put their convictions to practical use. In addition to 
impassioned rhetoric, how did the Six advocate violence in their day-to-day work for 
abolitionism? Furthermore, did their attitude toward violence change after the failure of 
the Harper’s Ferry raid and John Brown’s subsequent death? These men stand as only 
one example of militant abolitionism during the antebellum period, but their involvement 
in Brown’s raid drives them into the historical spotlight. Because the Six only lent their 
financial and moral support, it may be easy to overlook their role as supporting actors 
who labored behind the scenes, But Brown was penniless and, because many of his allies 
in Kansas were not much wealthier, the raid could not have occurred without Brown’s 
New England supporters, especially the Secret Six.
8 Michael Fellman, “Theodore Parker and the Abolitionist Role in the 1850s” Journal o f  American History 
61 (1974), 666.
7Several historians have addressed the abolitionists’ shift to violent techniques, 
although there is debate about when abolitionists began to condone violence. Herbert 
Aptheker’s article “Militant Abolitionism” (1941) was among the first to address this 
issue, arguing that militant abolitionism was not a new idea in the early nineteenth 
century. Besides citing abolitionist literature from the Revolutionary War era, he 
declares that by the 1850s “militant ideas were so frequently expressed that one is 
justified in declaring that, among anti-slavery folk, they became common-place.”9
Other prominent historians disagree. John Demos’s “The Antislavery Movement 
and the Problem of Violent ‘Means’” (1964) argues that the anti-slavery movement only 
became receptive to violent techniques during the 1850s, when non-resistance and more 
peaceful avenues had been deemed unfruitful. Similarly, “Confrontation and Abolition in 
the 1850s,” published in 1972 by Jane and William Pease, concludes that, while 
abolitionists had always been radical, by the 1850s moral indignation led to confrontation 
as abolitionists not only sought to annihilate the slave system, but also began to aid 
fugitive slaves. Both Demos and the Peases pinpoint the Fugitive Slave Law as the 
pivotal moment for this transformation.10
Lawrence Friedman, author of Gregarious Saints: Se lf and Community in 
American Abolitionism (1982), finds the middle ground, contending that there was not a 
seamless conversion—abolitionists as a whole did not move from 100 percent acceptance
9 Herbert Aptheker, “Militant Abolitionism” Journal o f Negro History 26 (1941), 463. However, in 
Abolitionism: A Revolutionary Movement (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), Aptheker confines this 
militancy to the approval o f slave resistance only, defining militancy as the acknowledgement “o f the 
propriety and justice o f  armed resistance by the slaves” (124). This limits its definition rather sharply. In 
my thesis I take this definition a step or two further to include the acceptance o f violence in other contexts 
besides slave resistance.
10 John Demos, “The Antislavery Movement and the Problem o f  Violent ‘Means’” New pMgland Quarterly 
37 (1964), 502, 524; Jane H. Pease and William H. Pease, “Confrontation and Abolition in the 1850s” 
Journal o f  American History 58 (1972), 927, 930.
8of moral suasion to 100 percent passion for violence. According to Friedman, there was 
a dual commitment to both techniques, although starting in the 1830s the balance shifted 
toward militant abolitionism.11
Each of these historians has contributed to our understanding of violent 
abolitionism by raising powerful questions about how (and when) violent abolitionism 
gained a foothold. I hope to build on their foundation by looking specifically at the real- 
world contexts and implications of violence, in addition to militant rhetoric. The Secret 
Six, as a faction within radical abolitionism, perfectly illustrate these principles, since all 
of the Six became more radicalized by their personal experiences during their abolitionist 
work.
Looking at the historiography of the Secret Six as a collective unit, the four 
authors who have tackled this intriguing assembly of men portray them in very different 
manners. Jeffery Rossbach’s Ambivalent Conspirators: John Brown, the Secret Six, and 
a Theory o f  Slave Violence (1982) paints the Six as reluctant advisors and financiers who 
were uneasy with violent abolitionism. Edward Renahan’s The Secret Six: The True Tale 
o f the Men Who Conspired with John Brown (1995) clearly demonstrates their 
involvement in violence, and Renahan maintains that the Six accepted violent techniques 
prior to their relationship with Brown.12 John McKivigan’s article, “His Soul Goes
11 Lawrence J. Friedman, Gregarious Saints: Self and Community in American Abolitionism, 1830-1870 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 196-197. In many ways, this interpretation is the most 
logical because it acknowledges that abolitionists wanted to succeed in their efforts, and thus would accept
whatever means would be the most useful— violent, non-violent, and anything in between.
12 Jeffery Rossbach, Ambivalent Conspirators: John Brown, The Secret Six, and a  Theory o f Slave 
Violence (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 1983) and Edward J. Renahan, Jr., The Secret 
Six: The True Tale o f  the Men Who Conspired with John Brown (New York: Crown Publishers, 1995). 
While there are biographies and other works dealing with the role o f a particular member o f the Six, these 
do not provide a sense o f the grander narrative. Jeffery Rossbach and Edward Renahan build the narrative 
foundation and demonstrate the internal inconsistencies and struggles o f  these men. Because these authors
9Marching On: The Story of John Brown’s Followers after the Harper’s Ferry Raid,” 
argues that the Six did continue to accept violence after 1859, citing their involvement in 
civil rights and emancipation.13 Otto Scott’s depiction of the Six in The Secret Six: John 
Brown and the Abolitionist Movement (1979) is unflattering and unsympathetic to their 
cause and to the entire abolitionist movement.14
While these authors have focused on creating a narrative account of events, I plan 
to paint a before-and-after picture of the Six’s involvement in abolitionism that 
illuminates their acceptance of violent means by outlining their role as radicals prior to 
the raid and their (for the most part) continued adherence to militancy after 1859. Also, 
this work will discuss how the Six interacted with other abolitionists, such as William 
Lloyd Garrison and Lewis Tappan. These discussions will point the way to my main 
research question: Did the Secret Six’s understanding of their role in the abolitionist 
movement change after the failure of the Harper’s Ferry raid, particularly regarding 
militant abolitionism? If not, why? Ultimately, I argue that the Six did not necessarily 
change their opinions about militancy and violence, although some did distance 
themselves from Brown himself. They lauded him as a hero and martyr, but avoided 
linking themselves directly to his actions at Harper’s Ferry (a paradox which I will 
explore in the last chapter). The Six did continue to advocate violent means, but after the 
raid they became more inclined to temper their violent message, having now seen the
are two o f the first to write on the Six as a collective unit, they cannot focus specifically on the Six’s 
attitudes toward violence. I will build on these works by honing in on this more precise topic.
13 This essay is found in Antislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, and Cultural Conflict in Antebellum 
America, ed. John R. McKivigan and Stanley Harrold (Knoxville: University o f  Tennessee Press, 1999), 
274-297. McKivigan’s article focuses mostly on Brown’s other supporters, such as Richard Hinton and 
James Redpath, instead o f emphasizing the work of the Secret Six.
14 Otto J. Scott, The Secret Six: John Brown and the Abolitionist Movement (New York: Times Books, 
1979). Because Scott adopts a strong, pro-Southern perspective, his discussion o f  abolitionism appears to 
be rather biased, which may explain why his book is rarely cited in other secondary works on the Six.
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consequences of violent abolitionism. With the exceptions of Gerrit Smith and Franklin 
Sanbom, the Six continued steadfastly in their abolitionist work, convinced that, even 
though Brown’s attempt had failed in the most obvious sense, his courage in the midst of 
failure would stir Northern hearts, drawing others to the cause.15 Brown had only been 
one warrior in the stmggle against slavery, and his time had passed.
This thesis will focus on neither a narrative history of the Six’s involvement with 
John Brown nor a detailed analysis of the attack on Harper’s Ferry. I am interested 
instead in the Six as a case study of violent abolitionism, uncovering the motivations 
behind their dedication to militancy. I endeavor to provide appropriate background 
material without digressing into a synthesis of radical abolitionism—a topic which has 
already received worthy treatment. Chapter 1 will focus primarily on the nature of 
abolition in the nineteenth century, discussing the rise o f immediatism and the 
development of radical abolitionist principles. I will also elaborate on the Secret Six and 
their significance within the greater reform movement, outlining their shift toward violent 
means. Chapter 2 will focus on the Harper’s Ferry raid and its aftermath, particularly the 
Secret Six’s reactions to Brown’s failure. In addition, I will address the public responses 
from Northerners and Southerners alike.
15 Gerrit Smith did not continue to support abolitionism due to his nervous breakdown shortly after the raid. 
Franklin Sanborn’s move away from abolitionism was partly thanks to his growing obligations as a 
schoolteacher in Concord. Both o f  these situations will be discussed further in later chapters.
CHAPTER I 
THE CHANGING FACE OF ABOLITIONISM
“What can the fr ien d s o f  em ancipation effect w hile the sp irit o f  s la very  is so  fearfu lly  p reva len t?
L et every man take his stand, burn out this prejudice, live it down. ’’ Theodore S. Wright, 1837
From the moment when escaped slave Frederick Douglass first flipped through 
the pages of William Lloyd Garrison’s Liberator, his “soul was set all on fire.”1 
Garrison’s newspaper, as Douglass wrote in his first autobiography, “became my meat 
and my drink.... Its sympathy for my brethren in bonds—its scathing denunciations of 
slaveholders—its faithful exposures of slavery... sent a thrill of joy through my soul, such 
as I had never felt before!”2 Spurred on by the encouraging words he found within its 
pages, Frederick Douglass began attending anti-slavery meetings, eventually becoming 
one of the most eloquent, passionate advocates of abolition. He knew the horrors of 
slavery firsthand. The beatings, mutiliations, and abuse he had witnessed and had 
himself endured would remain imprinted in his memory. Douglass and his fellow 
abolitionists did more than simply speak out against slavery; they revealed the injustice 
of the system through former slaves’ personal stories and physical scars—tangible proof 
of its brutality. Abolitionists gave slavery a human face and demonstrated that it could
1 Frederick Douglass, Frederick Douglass: The Narrative and Selected Writings, ed. Michael Meyer (New 
York: Random House, 1984), 119.
2 Ibid.
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not be ignored by whites resting comfortably on their freedoms while their black brethren 
languished under the bonds of the evil institution.
Who Were the Abolitionists?
Abolitionists came from all backgrounds and all walks of life—they were 
laborers, teachers, ministers, businessmen, husbands, and wives, all joined by a common 
cause. Some, like Gerrit Smith, were independently wealthy, while others, like John 
Brown, led simple, unadorned lives with little financial stability. Although well-to-do 
Northerners comprised most of the movement’s leadership, rank-and-file abolitionists 
were not bourgeoisie or wealthy professionals. And, while white Southerners (and many 
Northerners) depicted them as crazed fanatics with no grasp of reality, this presumption 
could not be further from the truth.
Interpretations of the word “abolitionist,” historiographically speaking, are highly 
subjective. During the first half of the twentieth century, scholars such as Avery O. 
Craven and Ulrich B. Phillips portrayed abolitionists as a fanatical minority, 
overwhelmed by neuroses that inhibited compromise between North and South.4 In the 
mid-twentieth century, however, more sympathetic studies emerged. This neo­
abolitionist school, led by Lewis Perry, John Demos, Robert Abzug and others, depicted 
abolitionists as middle-class, forward-thinking reformers who launched a significant 
movement advocating basic human rights for all races. More recent studies at the end of 
the twentieth century have embraced this interpretation and expanded it to previously
3 Herbert Aptheker, Abolitionism: A Revolutionary Movement (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), 35.
4 John R. McKivigan and Stanley Harrold, introduction to A ntislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, and 
Cultural Conflict in Antebellum America, ed. John R. McKivigan and Stanley Harrold, 1-37 (Knoxville: 
University o f Tennessee Press, 1999), 9.
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neglected fields, focusing on relationships between black and white abolitionists and on 
abolition in the early republic.5
Beginnings of Abolitionism
While the American abolitionist movement hit its stride during the 1830s, it was 
not confined to this period—anti-slavery ideas were germinating during the post- 
revolutionaiy era. Religious fervor and the rise of evangelicalism encouraged this 
fledgling abolitionism by emphasizing free will and equality among all Christian 
believers.6 This dedication to Christian principle convinced these early abolitionists of 
slavery’s sinfulness, and they opposed slavery on the grounds that, in Christ, there is 
neither slave nor free, black nor white. Eighteenth-century abolitionists also drew 
support from Enlightenment ideas, turning to such philosophers as Montesquieu, who 
claimed that slavery denigrated the humanity o f the master as much as the humanity of 
the slave.
Early abolitionists favored slow progress toward emancipation rather than 
instantaneous changes in master-slave relations. This doctrine of gradualism was the 
predominant frame of mind for eighteenth-century abolitionists because it took into 
consideration that a balance of power within the U.S. government protected slavery, and 
also, that early abolitionist societies had branches in the South. William Rawle, onetime 
president of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, founded in 1775, expressed the 
prevailing belief in gradual, conciliatory means, writing that “an abhorrence of slavery 
would gradually work its way, and that it was the duty of the society patiently to wait the
5 Stanley Harrold, American Abolitionists (New York: Longman Press, 2001), 5.
6 Gerald Sorin, Abolitionism: A New Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 24-25.
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event.” Anti-slavery advocates could hope to make significant headway in their 
community, but potential repercussions of emancipation, including disunion and anarchy, 
kept them from aiming too high.8 The Pennsylvania Abolition Society, the premier anti­
slavery engine of the eighteenth century, fully endorsed gradualism, claiming that 
“government interference... was the key.”9 This society emphasized working through 
legal and political avenues, such as providing legal assistance for kidnapped free blacks.10 
Historian Benjamin Quarles has concluded that “when realistically assessed... the 
abolitionist movement of the federalist era must be accounted a failure.... The early 
abolitionists created no general sentiment against slavery.”11 This task would be left to 
the future generation of abolitionist reformers, including members of the Secret Six.
Amid the work of gradualists arose a movement proposing the removal of African 
Americans to a new home in Africa. Founded in 1816 by Robert Finley, the American 
Colonization Society believed that colonization would lead to the gradual emancipation 
of slaves by demonstrating that African Americans were self-reliant.12 However, 
undertones of racism pervaded the movement. Some colonizationists argued that all free 
blacks, whether they were legally freed or fugitives, posed a threat to Northern society, a 
belief that reflected the common Northern fear of a massive influx of free blacks.13 The 
“natural” difference among races, according to some colonizationists, entailed their
7 Edward R. Turner, The Negro in Pennsylvania (Washington, D C ., 1911), 220, quoted in Benjamin 
Quarles, Black Abolitionists (New York. Oxford University Press, 1969), 10.
8 David Brion Davis, “The Emergence o f Immediatism in British and American Antislavery Thought” 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 49 (1962), 217.
9 Richard S. Newman, The Transformation o f American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early 
Republic (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 2002), 5.
10 Ibid.
11 Quarles, 13.
12 Jane E. Dabel, “Colonization Movement, African” in The Oxford Companion to United States History, 
ed. Paul S. Boyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 146. For more on colonization, see P. J. 
Staundenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (1961).
13 Merton Dillon, The Abolitionists: The Growth o f  a  Dissenting Minority (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 1974), 67. Also see Newman, 112.
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separation instead of equality.14 However, despite this limited perspective, “the 
American Colonization Society was the only truly national organization [at this point] 
that even pretended to deal with the slavery issue,” according to historian Bertram Wyatt- 
Brown. 15 By 1830, the ACS had over two hundred state and local auxiliaries.16 For a 
time, Gerrit Smith was an active participant in the movement, although he changed his 
tune in the 1830s. Smith, like many other abolitionists who had once accepted 
colonization, came to see the inherent racism of the society’s agenda.
Immediatism and the Rise of Abolitionist Societies
During the 1820s and 1830s, the abolitionist movement shifted away from 
colonization and the gradualist doctrine, adopting a new sense of urgency. This doctrine 
of immediatism embodied a directness and forcefulness uncharacteristic of gradualist 
techniques, which had failed to accomplish lasting change. Immediatist doctrine 
demanded that abolitionists immediately recognized slavery as a sinful institution and, in
17response, make an immediate personal commitment to work toward its downfall. An
1825 letter in the Boston Recorder and Telegraph described it this way: “The
slaveholding system must be abolished... to the accomplishment of this end, immediate,
18determined measures must be adopted for the ultimate emancipation of every slave.”
This sense of urgency directly affected the development of militant abolitionism—if
14 Sorin, 41.
15 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Lewis Tappati and the Evangelical War Against Slavery (Cleveland, OH: The 
Press o f  Case Western Reserve University, 1969), 84.
16 Paul Goodman, O f One Blood: Abolitionism and the Origins o f  Racial Equality (Berkeley, CA: 
University o f  California Press, 1998), 2.
17 Sorin, 38.
18 Sorin, 39.
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gradualism had remained the reigning doctrine, there would have been no move toward 
violent techniques.
While the term immediatism could denote work for the immediate emancipation 
of slaves, it was also seen by many abolitionists as the manifestation of a fresh, 
uncompromising attitude toward the abolitionist crusade. Gradualists had assumed that 
progress was a given, but immediatists believed that a newfound sense of urgency and 
responsibility was the only way to jolt the North out of its complacency. Immediatist 
firebrands questioned the predominance of Northern anti-slavery principles by 
“denigrating as ‘hollow sympathy’ Northern opinion that acquiesced in slavery’s vast 
expansion.”19
According to historian David Brion Davis, immediatism “represented a shift in 
total outlook from a detached, rationalistic perspective on human history and progress to
Of)a personal commitment to make no compromise with sin.” Thanks to the religious 
revivals of the early nineteenth century, abolitionists became even more convinced that 
slavery was a violation of Christian principle and an affront to the teachings of Scripture. 
As Lawrence Friedman writes, abolitionists believed that “slaveholding was a spirit that 
caused one man to reign over another in defiance of God’s laws, with chaos the inevitable 
result.”21
In an 1835 speech, New York abolitionist Gerrit Smith, who had attended revival 
meetings in the Burned-Over District, argued that the warriors in the battle against
19 Goodman, 106.
20 Davis, 228.
21 Lawrence J. Friedman, Gregarious Saints: Self and Community in American Abolitionism, 1850-1870 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 64.
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slavery must “stand on the rock of Christian principle’5 to promptly stamp out this sin.22 
He also wrote a letter to Southern minister James Smylie in 1837, asserting that “slavery 
substitutes the will of a fallible fellow-man for that infallible rule of action—the will of 
God.... God cannot approve of a system of servitude, in which the master is guilty of 
assuming absolute power—of assuming God’s place and relation toward his fellow- 
men.”23 Although early abolitionists had made similar religious arguments against 
slavery, the rise of evangelicalism prompted more Northerners to refuse to compromise 
with sin, including Gerrit Smith, future member of the Secret Six.
Along with this fresh breath of immediatism flowed a deep-seated desire among 
many Northern abolitionists for racial equality in the United States. These reformers 
focused the fight for equality on two fronts. First, they attempted to demonstrate racial 
equality through the Bible and scientific theory. Second, they showed how the degraded 
environment of slavery had hampered black development, thus countering the widespread 
belief in African Americans’ genetic inferiority.24 According to Paul Goodman, most 
anti-slavery society constitutions placed racial equality as second only to abolition— 
opposition to slavery and opposition to racial intolerance were two sides of the same 
coin.25 Abolitionists in the 1830s were essentially the first to work toward racial equality, 
believing that “the abandonment of prejudice is required of us as a proof of our sincerity
22 [Gerrit Smith], “Gerrit Smith Defends the Right of Abolitionists to Discuss Slavery,” in The 
Abolitionists: A Collection o f  Their Writings, ed. Louis Ruchames, 113-117 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1963), 117.
23 [Gerrit Smith], Letter o f  Gerrit Smith to Rev. James Smylie, o f  the State o f  Mississippi (New York: 
American Anti-Slavery Society, 1837; repr., The Anti-Slavery Examiner: Nos, 1-6, 1836-1838, Westport, 
CT: Negro Universities Press, 1970), 10-11.
24 James McPherson, “A Brief for Equality: The Abolitionist Reply to the Racist Myth, 1860-1865” in The 
Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists, ed. Martin Duberman, 156-177 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965), 157.
25 Goodman, xix.
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and consistency.”26 Sometimes white abolitionists did adopt a degree of paternalism, but 
when judged against other men and women of the nineteenth century, they were forward-
27thinking reformers.
White abolitionists took their cue from their black colleagues, conquering some of 
their prejudices by working with black abolitionists who fought for their individual 
equality as well as that of their race. Northern blacks, whether fugitives or legally freed, 
took great interest in the abolitionist cause, and many became involved with existing anti- 
slavery societies, while others formed their own auxiliaries. Blacks supported 
abolitionist newspapers as well—in fact, three-fourths of those who subscribed to 
William Lloyd Garrison’s Liberator in 1834 were of African-American descent.
Frederick Douglass encouraged black participation in the anti-slavery struggle, arguing 
that “the man who has suffered the wrong is the man to demand redress—that the man 
struck is the man to cry out— and that he who has endured the cruel pangs o f  slavery is 
the man to advocate liberty,”30 Blacks’ tireless efforts were birthed out of personal 
experiences with racism and bondage and, because of this perspective, militancy
26 William C. Nell, The Colored Patriots o f  the American Revolution (1855; repr., New York, 1968), 350- 
351, quoted in Goodman, 1.
27 A concise discussion o f  abolitionists’ imperfections is William H. Pease and Jane H. Pease, “Antislavery 
Ambivalence: Immediatism, Expediency, Race” American Quarterly 17 (Winter 1965): 682-695. I would 
argue that it is important to understand the weaknesses and prejudices o f  abolitionists, but that their 
downfall in these areas should not negate their positive attributes and their desire to help slaves realize their 
freedom. When seen in light o f general sentiment toward blacks in the North, abolitionists d id  have a more 
enlightened view o f African-Americans, albeit an imperfect one.
28 For further reading on black abolitionists’ role within the movement, see Leon F. Litwack, “The 
Emancipation o f  the Negro Abolitionist,” in Blacks in the Abolitionist Movement, ed. John H. Bracey, Jr., 
August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1971), 67-78. Litwack 
addresses the tensions between black and white abolitionists, as well as the ways in which black 
abolitionists stepped out and made the movement their own. This article can also be found in The 
Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists, ed. Martin Duberman (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965), 137-155.
29 Charles H. Wesley, “The Negro in the Organization o f Abolition,” in Blacks in the Abolitionist 
Movement, ed. John H. Bracey, Jr., August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick, 54-66 (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing, 1971), 55.
30 The North Star, Dec. 3, 1847, quoted in Aptheker, Abolitionism, 66.
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developed more quickly among black abolitionists.31 It was this dedication to violent 
means that “gave abolition its hard edge.”32 In fact, as Herbert Aptheker writes,
“Without their illumination of the nature of slavery, [and] without their persistent 
struggle to be free, there would have been no national Abolitionist movement.”33 
Abolitionists, including future members of the Secret Six, drew from their interactions 
with black abolitionists as they sought to gain a deeper understanding of the horrors of 
slavery.
White immediatists (unlike their black compatriots) did not, however, have a solid 
understanding of Northern sentiments toward slavery. As Bertram Wyatt-Brown writes, 
“These reformers so grossly overestimated Southern goodwill and underrated Northern 
racial prejudice that one must question their political wisdom while admiring their moral 
fortitude.”34 Inherent racial prejudice aside, immediatism did challenge the Northern 
value system and threatened to dampen national optimism by suggesting that American 
society had fundamental defects. In the 1830s, as abolitionists were getting their feet 
wet, many Northerners believed that a direct attack on slavery could lead to a frontal 
assault on private property and the sanctity o f the Union. Immediatists had to counteract 
this public recoil against abolitionist “extremism.”35
In the midst of this strategic reversal in favor of immediatism, the geographical 
center of the abolitionist movement also shifted. With the Pennsylvania Abolition 
Society’s gradualist techniques fading from view, new anti-slavery societies sprang up in
31 Herbert Aptheker, “Militant Abolitionism” Journal o f Negro History 26 (1941), 459.
32 Sorin, 105.
33 Aptheker, Abolitionism , xiii.
34 Wyatt-Brown, 83.
35 Martin Duberman, “The Northern Response to Slavery” in The Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the 
Abolitionists, ed. Martin Duberman, 395-413 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 395, 398.
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the Northeast. A major player in the Massachusetts abolitionist movement was William 
Lloyd Garrison. Garrison had first entered the scene as co-editor of the Genius o f  
Universal Emancipation, a weekly newspaper started by Benjamin Lundy. Like many 
other New England reformers, Garrison converted to immediatism in the late 1820s, 
laboring tirelessly to foster public awareness about the importance of immediatist 
techniques and to convince the North that the sinfulness of slavery could not be 
ignored.36
In 1831, Garrison and fifteen of his colleagues formed the New England Anti- 
Slavery Society in Boston. Garrison and his followers, who included Theodore Parker, 
determined that moral suasion and political action (without violence) could persuade 
Americans to fight slavery. They endorsed boycotts of slave-produced products and the 
dissemination of their message through churches and the press.37 At the inaugural 
conference of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1833, Garrison helped author a 
Declaration of Sentiments. This declaration called for “the destruction of error by the 
potency of truth,” demanding immediate emancipation and guaranteed civil rights for 
all free blacks. This national society became the preeminent anti-slavery institution, 
working in concert with the New England Anti-Slavery Society and other local 
auxiliaries. Many influential figures worked closely with Garrison in his endeavors, 
including Abby Kelley, Lydia Maria Child, Wendell Phillips, and Ellis Loring.
An additional anti-slavery group that gained prominence was based in New York 
and Ohio under the direction of Lewis Tappan. Unlike Garrison’s Boston circle, Tappan 
and his colleagues—who included his brother Arthur, Amos Phelps, Theodore Dwight
36 Dillon, The Abolitionists, 36.
37 Dillon, The Abolitionists, 55.
38 Ibid.
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Weld, and Joshua Leavitt—were involved in other benevolent reforms besides abolition. 
Also, since many of them hailed from Congregationalist backgrounds and supported
39Charles Finney’s evangelical revival, this group linked itself closely to the church. The 
religious awakenings of the 1820s had created a spirit of reform, stimulating men and 
women to express their Christian love through social action. The anti-slavery movement, 
particularly in New York’s Burned-Over District, consequently gained a motivated, 
impassioned membership.40
Another anti-slavery group in New York State, centered around Gerrit Smith, 
embraced a different tack by focusing on political avenues and cultural voluntarism, a 
philosophy proclaiming that all people were free to follow God’s commands, but that the 
Christian community should encourage them to use this freedom voluntarily.41 To exert 
the societal pressure necessary for the penetration of abolitionist ideas, Smith and his 
associates—who included Beriah Green, William Goodell, and William Chaplin— 
determined that a broader base was needed. They found this base in politics. By the 
1840s, Smith and his allies had parted with Garrison and joined the Liberty Party in the 
hopes that such an alliance would transform the major parties and make abolition a 
significant topic for debate.42 Samuel Howe, another future member of the Secret Six, 
subscribed to political abolitionism, running for office in 1846 as a Conscience Whig. 
Although he lost the election, Howe, like his colleague Gerrit Smith, continued to support 
political means as a weapon against slavery.43
39 Friedman, 69.
40 Ronald G. Walters, The Antislavery Appeal: American Abolitionism After 1830 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), 38.
41 Friedman, 102.
42 Friedman, 111, 115.
43 Jeffery Rossbach, Ambivalent Conspirators: John Brown, the Secret Six, and a Theory o f  Slave Violence 
(Philadelphia. University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 28.
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Naturally, these abolitionists are grouped together loosely, and members of the 
Secret Six traveled amidst these fluid organizations. As a resident of Massachusetts, 
Theodore Parker did interact with Garrison and his followers, although his 
Congregationalist background also tied him to Tappan’s group of evangelicals.
Similarly, Smith’s place at the head of the New York movement did not supersede his 
friendships and professional relationships with Boston abolitionists.44
Radicals in the Making
This geographic shift towards New England and the rise of immediatist anti­
slavery agitation did not, however, come without consequence. In response to 
abolitionism’s renewed dedication to extinguishing slavery, the South attempted to 
counter abolitionist advances by protecting Southern interests more aggressively.45 Many 
historians, including Lawrence Friedman, have forwarded the push-shove interpretation 
of sectional conflict in the antebellum period, arguing that even though abolitionists were 
under-funded and numerically small, the South still perceived abolitionism as a large 
social movement fed by fanatical hatred of the Southern way of life, leading Southerners 
to adopt a defensive stance against the North. This defensive attitude led to the passage 
of the Fugitive Slave Law and the battle over Kansas Territory, two profound events 
during the 1850s that altered the face of abolitionism once again by feeding the growing 
sectional divide and bringing converts to the abolitionist cause.
44 The other members o f the Secret Six— Samuel Howe, Franklin Sanborn, Thomas W. Higginson, and 
George Steams— were mostly involved in the Kansas movement, not in abolition per se. As sister 
movements, Kansas aid workers did correspond frequently with New England abolitionists, expressing 
their anti-slavery views and catching up on newspaper headlines and local gossip. While these interactions 
with abolitionist colleagues may have influenced the abolitionist movement, the purpose o f the Kansas 
movement was work for the cause in Kansas.
45 Friedman, 4.
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As Jane Pease, William Pease, and John Demos have concluded, the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1850 provided the impetus for a change of attitude toward slavery. This 
law, an amendment to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, had been passed as part of the 
Compromise of 1850, which attempted to satisfy both North and South by balancing their 
conflicting interests. In the end, California would be admitted as a free state, but New 
Mexico and Utah would enter the union under the doctrine of popular sovereignty. In 
addition, the slave trade in the District of Columbia was abolished, but a new fugitive 
slave law was passed to appease the South. This law took jurisdiction over fugitive cases 
away from Northern courts and placed this jurisdiction in the hands of newly appointed 
fugitive slave commissioners, who could issue warrants for the capture of runaway slaves 
and could even pursue these runaways onto Northern soil.46 Furthermore, Northern 
citizens, regardless of their beliefs about slavery, were now obligated to help apprehend 
fugitive slaves.47 According to Merton Dillon, “the new Fugitive Slave Law was... as 
much an assertion of Southern power and dominance within the nation as it was an effort 
to facilitate the recovery of valuable property.”48
Architects o f the compromise, including Stephen Douglas, believed that they had 
saved the Union by at least partially satisfying both North and South—and in the months 
shortly after the adoption of the compromise, this seemed to be the case. Many 
Northerners did not express distaste for the law because they wanted most of all to keep
46 Stanley W. Campbell, “Fugitive Slave Act (1850),” in The Oxford Companion to United States History, 
ed. Paul S. Boyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 294. From the Southern perspective, attempts 
to enforce the law often proved very costly, and highly publicized escape attempts convinced Southerners 
that the North was uniting against slavery. This news came at a time when slaveholders’ interests 
demanded slavery’s spread into the North— not the growth o f sectional differences that would further 
polarize the nation.
47 Jane H. Pease and William H. Pease, “Confrontation and Abolition in the 1850s” Journal o f American 
History 58 (1972), 926.
48 Dillon, The Abolitionists, 176.
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the Union intact, fearing that an attack on the compromise would lead to dissolution.
Thus, up until 1854, the most vehement opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law came from 
abolitionists.49
However, after 1854, a backlash of Northern public opinion arose, turning 
Northern anti-slavery sentiment on its head. Most Northerners had initially looked past 
the injustice of the compromise, but with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 
1854 and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, slavery could be extended almost 
indefinitely to the Pacific coast. Many in the North now believed that the Compromise of 
1850 had accomplished nothing—not only had the Southern slave power crept past their 
doorstep (in the form of slave catchers), but the South had violated the tentative peace 
within the nation by seeking to expand slavery even further.
Before passage of the new law, several members of the Six had assisted fugitive 
slaves, an act that would now hold even greater consequences. In 1841, for instance, 
Gerrit Smith purchased the freedom of a family of seven, paying 3,500 dollars.50 In 
1846, at the meeting which formed the Boston Vigilance Committee, Samuel Howe had 
made his first abolitionist speech in support of hiding fugitives, distraught by the fact that 
slavery “has at last spread abroad its murky wings, and has covered us with its 
benumbing shadow.... State Street is deaf to the cry of the oppressed slave;... the port of
49 Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave Catchers: Enforcement o f the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860 (Chapel 
Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1968), 55. Naturally, northern blacks were opposed to the law as 
well. With its passage, every Northern black, whether a free individual or a fugitive, could potentially be 
kidnapped and taken south. According to Campbell, an estimated 300 black citizens o f Pittsburgh fled to 
Canada within the ten days after the bill became law. African-American churches in upstate New York 
also reported that large portions o f their congregation had fled (62-3).
50 Ralph Volney Harlow, Gerrit Smith: Philanthropist and Reformer (New York: Henry Holt, 1939), 270.
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Boston has been opened to the slave-trader.’"51 This aid for fugitives would now come 
under attack with the passage of the Compromise of 1850.
Abolitionists were naturally at the forefront of the Northern outburst against the 
Fugitive Slave Law. Lewis Tappan, who continued to abhor bloodshed, stated that this 
law was “a palpable violation of the Constitution... because it compels every citizen of 
the free States to be a ‘slave-catcher . ”52 Harriet Beecher Stowe, daughter of abolitionist 
Henry Ward Beecher, was appalled by the law and published Uncle Tom's Cabin in 
1852. Her portrait o f a slave mother and child fleeing from a cruel master clearly 
referred to the injustice of the law and educated the public about the plight of Southern 
blacks.
Charles Beecher, looking at its passage from a religious point of view, said, “this 
law... is an unexampled climax of sin. It is the monster iniquity of the present age, and it 
will stand forever on the page of history, as the vilest monument of infamy of the 
nineteenth century.”53 John Brown, using a Biblical analogy, organized a League of 
Gileadites in Springfield, Ohio, to offer physical resistance to the act; the resolutions of 
the league were signed by 44 black citizens of Springfield. In a letter to his wife in
51 Laura E. Richards, Samuel Gridley Howe (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1935), 192-193. Although 
this biography is written by Howe’s daughter, it appears to be accurate and comprehensive, with one 
exception: she makes no real mention o f his involvement in the Harper’s Ferry raid. However, events 
earlier in his life are less controversial and consequently her account o f these events is more trustworthy. 
Her decision to leave out Harper’s Ferry, and thus omit a discussion o f her father’s paranoid reaction to the 
raid, is understandable considering that she would seek to portray her father in a positive light.
52 Lewis Tappan, The Fugitive Slave Bill: Its History and Constitutionality... (New York, 1850), 20.
53 Charles Beecher, The Duty o f  Disobedience to Wicked Laws. A Sermon on the Fugitive Slave Law (New  
York: J. A. Gray, 1851), 13, quoted in Campbell, The Slave Catchers, 50.
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November 1850, he wrote that he encouraged his black neighbors to “trust in God and 
keep their powder dry.”54
Future members of the Secret Six joined with Beecher, Stowe, and others in 
condemning the law. In a letter to Thomas Higginson, firebrand Theodore Parker called 
the law “the formal federal endorsement of kidnapping.”55 In a sermon delivered shortly 
after the law’s enactment, Parker encouraged his parishioners to aid fugitives “peaceably 
if they can, forcibly if they must, but by all means to do it.”56 Upon hearing of the law’s 
passage, George Luther Steams obtained a pistol and pledged to harbor slaves under his 
own roof.57
Expressing their outrage, Theodore Parker, Samuel Howe, Thomas Higginson, 
Gerrit Smith and a myriad of other key abolitionists became involved in vigilance 
committees that aided fugitives by providing shelter, helping them flee to Canada, and 
offering legal advice. In its resolutions of 1850, the Boston Vigilance Committee 
declared that “it shall be their duty to endeavor by all just means to secure the fugitives 
and colored inhabitants of Boston and any vicinity from any invasion of their rights by 
persons acting under this law [i.e. the Fugitive Slave Law].”58 Committee members were 
to keep watch and be ever aware.
54 David Potter, “John Brown and the Paradox o f Leadership Among American Negroes” in Blacks in the 
Abolitionist Movement, ed. John H. Bracey, Jr., August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick, 149-159 (Belmont, 
CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1971), 152.
55 Theodore Parker to Thomas Higginson, July 27, 1850, Thomas W. Higginson Papers, Boston Public 
Library, quoted in Edward J. Renahan Jr., The Secret Six: The True Tale o f  the Men Who Conspired with 
John Brown (New York: Crown Publishers, 1995), 49.
56 Renahan, 50.
57 Frank Preston Steams, The Life and Public Services o f  George Luther Stearns (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott, 1907; repr., New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969), 84.
58 Theodore Parker, Life and Correspondence o f  Theodore Parker, Minister o f  the Twenty-Eighth 
Congregational Society, Boston, ed. John Weiss (New York: D. Appleton, 1864), 2:94.
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Samuel Howe actively participated in the underground railroad and supported 
other endeavors of the Boston Vigilance Committee. Gerrit Smith financially supported 
the New York Vigilance Committee, and when the committee needed to cover food and
SQtransportation costs, Smith gave five hundred dollars to their cause. Similarly, Thomas 
Higginson acted to secure the freedom of fugitive slaves, and during the rendition of a 
former slave, Anthony Bums, he even led an abolitionist attack against the courthouse 
where Bums was being held.60
In the case of William and Ellen Craft, which took place in 1850, Theodore 
Parker, Ellis Loring, and Lewis Hayden all helped conceal the couple until the vigilance 
committee could force the slave catchers out of Boston. Just before sending the Crafts to 
safety in England, Parker legally married them.61 Parker wrote that during the service he 
gave William Craft a sword, and “told him of his manly duty therewith, if need were, to 
defend the life and liberty of Ellen.... ‘With this sword I thee wed," suited the 
circumstances of that bridal.”62 Although this vigilance committee had been organized 
prior to the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law, their work in Boston became more visible 
and assertive after this point.63
Another event that radicalized many abolitionists occurred after the passage of the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, which opened this Western territory for settlement under
59 Harlow, Gerrit Smith, 289.
60 Tilden G. Edelstein, Strange Enthusiasm: A Life o f  Thomas Wentworth Higginson (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1968), 158-159.
61 [Samuel Gridley Howe]., Letters and Journals o f  Samuel Gridley Howe, ed. Laura E. Richards, notes 
F.B. Sanborn (Boston: Dana Estes, 1909; repr., New York: AMS Press, 1973), 2:266.
62 Theodore Parker, The Trial o f  Theodore Parker fo r  the “Misdemeanor ” o f  a Speech in Faneuil Hall 
against Kidnapping... (Boston: Published for the author, 1855), 187. Parker also wrote: “I gave them both a 
Bible, which I had bought for the purpose, to be a symbol o f their spiritual culture and a help for their soul, 
as the sword was for their bodily life” (187).
63 Renahan, 51. Edward Renahan is convinced that, until after 1850, this committee had “no particular 
sense o f urgency” to aid slaves (49). He also sees a direct link between the increasing radicalism o f  the 
vigilance committee and Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry.
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the doctrine of popular sovereignty, making it fair game for slavery’s spread. Witnessing 
the influx of free-soil emigrants that entered Kansas, pro-slavery Missourians also 
flooded the territory, illegally stuffing ballot boxes to elect a pro-slavery territorial 
legislature in Lecompton. The free-staters quickly responded by forming their own 
legislature in Topeka which, although technically illegal in the eyes of the federal 
government, claimed to be legitimately elected. The battle for Kansas had begun.
By 1856 many Northerners, appalled by the Missouri border ruffians’ treatment of 
free-state settlers, had formed committees to send food, supplies, and sometimes even 
weapons to the beleaguered free-state Kansans. These men and women in the North 
adamantly believed that the doctrine of popular sovereignty was nothing more than a pro­
slavery swindle engineered to bring more slave states into the Union. According to 
Gerrit Smith’s biographer, Ralph Volney Harlow, Bleeding Kansas proved to be the 
breaking point that radicalized the North. Harlow argues that abolitionists saw the 
violence in Kansas as another manifestation of “the illegal and violent acts of the pro­
slavery party” and became persuaded that these pro-slavery actions deserved violence in 
return.64 Thus, Bleeding Kansas provided the Secret Six and other abolitionists with a 
forum for making good on their rhetoric—instead of simply speaking against slavery, 
they were acting against its spread into the West and becoming more confident in their 
radical approach to the war on slavery.
In 1854 the New England Emigrant Aid Company was established to provide 
reduced transportation rates and Sharp’s rifles to anti-slavery emigrants. Samuel Gridley 
Howe assisted in this fundraising effort and became involved in other committees which
64 Ralph Volney Harlow, “Gerrit Smith and the John Brown Raid” American Historical Review 38 (1932), 
33.
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sprang up within the next two years. On June 3, 1856, he attended a meeting in Faneuil 
Hall, Boston, which had been called to decide the best means for sending aid. Those in 
attendance set up the Faneuil Hall Committee to collect clothing and money, and within a 
month they had raised ten thousand dollars for the free-state cause.65 Later that year 
Howe attended a convention in Buffalo that founded another aid organization called the 
National Kansas Committee; Howe became a member of that committee as well, writing 
letters and raising funds.66
George Luther Steams, who had also attended the Faneuil Hall meeting in Boston, 
became an informal agent of that committee. While collecting donations, he formulated a 
plan to centralize the local aid committees under a single umbrella organization. On June 
5, 1856, citizens from Massachusetts gathered to hear his proposal, and they decided to 
form the Massachusetts State Kansas Committee with Steams as its chairman.67 He 
proved to be a conscientious coordinator and an inventive solicitor. He used his personal 
business contacts to create a fundraising network, and he traveled to various local 
branches to monitor their work and make suggestions. He also met with influential 
businessmen and politicians, emphasizing that “every dollar, every barrel of clothing and 
food was another blow struck for freedom.”68 Steams continued in this vein until 1858, 
when the Massachusetts State Kansas Committee perceived that aid was no longer 
necessary; Kansas was safely in Northern hands.69
65 Harold Schwartz, Samuel Gridley Howe: Social Reformer, 1801-1876 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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Stearns’s right-hand man in this undertaking was Franklin Sanborn, a young 
Concord schoolteacher who would later become enamored with John Brown. As 
Sanborn recalled in later years, his interest was sparked when his brother moved to 
Kansas in 1856, the most brutal year of fighting. “Between May, 1856, and January,
1857,1 passed through all the grades of these Kansas committees, beginning in June,
1856, as secretary of the Concord town committee;... accepting the post of secretary to 
the Massachusetts State Kansas Committee... and finally serving upon the national 
committee at its last meeting, in January, 1857.”70 Sanborn canvassed various towns in 
the state, holding meetings, accepting contributions, and appointing local committees.
He supervised the goods and money acquired, which he believed “was enough to carry
71our colonists in Kansas through their worst year.” Sanborn also traveled west in August 
1856 “on a tour o f inspection and consultation” through Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and 
Nebraska to examine the safety o f the emigrants’ route.72
Thomas Wentworth Higginson was also involved in the Massachusetts State 
Kansas Committee, procuring rifles and ammunition and traveling to Kansas in June 
1856. While in the territory he wrote “Letters from Kanzas,” which were published in 
the St. Louis Democrat, New York Tribune, and Chicago Tribune under the pseudonym
7TWorcester. He determined that Kansas needed more armed men and lamented the fact 
that only two thousand dollars and two emigrant parties had been raised.74
70 F. B. Sanborn, “Virginia Campaign o f John Brown,” pt. 3, Atlantic Monthly 35, no. 209 (1875), 324.
71 “Virginia Campaign,” pt. 3, 325.
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73 Edelstein, 184-187. These letters were reprinted in Anti-Slavery Tracts: Series 1; Nos. 1-20, 1855-1856 
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Higginson spoke with admiration about the settlers in the territory, especially 
those in Lawrence who were struggling to rebuild their town after the border ruffians’ 
attack in 1856. He wrote that he “had never seen such courage, such patience, such 
mutual generosity, such perfect buoyancy of spirit.”75 These letters from the front lines 
drummed up support for various aid committees by giving Northerners a glimpse of the 
daily struggles of free-state settlers in Kansas. With both their words and their actions, 
the Six supported those who were fighting slavery, and these settlers made the free-state 
presence a visible force in the territory thanks to the supplies and weapons procured from 
aid organizations in the East.
Contexts for Violence: Fugitive Slaves and Bleeding Kansas
The Secret Six and other radical abolitionists, appalled at the ferocity of Southern 
sentiment that was expressed in debates over fugitive slaves and Kansas Territory, 
became convinced that their strategies must change to counter the renewed threat of 
Southern aggression. According to Merton Dillon, “for many, pacifism, even in its most 
earnestly proclaimed phase, had been only a chosen strategy designed to fit the times 
rather than a matter o f deep conviction.”76 Nonresistance, such as that preached by 
Garrisonians, was gradually moving to the wayside as abolitionists became more willing 
to advocate violence as a key implement in their reforming crusade-—not only as a 
rhetorical device, but also as a practical reality.
75 Thomas Wentworth Higginson, A Ride Through Kanzas (New York. American Anti-Slavery Society, 
1856; repr., Anti-Slavery Tracts: Series I; Nos. 1-20, 1855-1856, Westport, CT: Negro Universities Press, 
1970), 10.
76 Merton L. Dillon, Slavery Attacked: Southern Slaves and Their Allies, 1619-1865 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 203.
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Some historians have maintained that abolitionists’ tactics did not change after the 
1840s, thus failing to take into account the development of practical means for 
implementing violence. Aileen Kraditor confined her study of abolition, entitled Means 
and Ends in American Abolitionism, to the period between 1834 and 1850, “because most 
of the major tactical problems that arose in the entire history of the movement were 
thrashed out within those seventeen years.”77 Louis Ruchames agrees, arguing that the 
abolitionists’ philosophies and strategies took form in the 1830s and 1840s, and “were
n o
not to undergo any significant change until the Civil War.” Both Kraditor and 
Ruchames are convinced that abolitionists did not alter their strategies in the 1850s—an 
assertion which disregards the radical wing of the movement. In light of the uproar 
surrounding the Fugitive Slave Law and Bleeding Kansas, it becomes clear that the 1850s 
were in fact the formative period for the practice of militant abolitionism.79
Thanks to the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, the first context for the practical 
adoption o f violent resistance was found in assisting fugitive slaves.80 Thomas 
Wentworth Higginson first spoke of violence in 1850 when William and Ellen Craft 
became susceptible to capture. He wrote that “they are terrible times when it becomes
77 Aileen S. Kraditor, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics on Strategy and 
Tactics, 1834-1850 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), vii-viii.
78 Louis Ruchames, preface in The Abolitionists: A Collection o f  Their Writings, ed. Louis Ruchames (G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1963), 11.
79 I would agree that the 1830s and 1840s were formative years in the movement as a  whole; the growth o f  
militant abolitionism at mid-century had certainly drawn from earlier developments. However, this is not 
to say that nothing of consequence occurred in the 1850s— since abolitionism was not stagnant these 
reformers, whether non-resistants or radicals, continued to adapt their techniques.
80 In Slavery Attacked, Dillon maintains that the growing number o f fugitives demonstrated that blacks 
were eager to free themselves, and when abolitionists realized slaves’ willingness to escape, they felt more 
inclined to abandon the doctrine o f non-resistance (206-7).
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necessary to speak of bloodshed; yet when it comes to the actual case, it is hard to say 
where a man must stop in defending his inalienable rights.”81
In the heated meeting called to protest the 1855 rendition of another former slave, 
Anthony Bums, Theodore Parker loudly proclaimed: “I love peace. But there is a means, 
and there is an end; Liberty is the end, and sometimes peace is not the means toward it.”82 
During the Bums rendition, Samuel Howe wrote Parker, saying that instead of a public 
meeting they needed “but a band of fifty, to say the man shall not go out into slavery, but 
over our bodies.”83 Thomas Higginson encouraged similar action, arguing that bloodshed 
cannot be avoided when defending one’s personal liberty.
There were other contexts that encouraged the Six and their radical abolitionist 
colleagues to implement violence, such as the bloody battle for Kansas Territory, which 
came to a head in 1856. According to Ralph Harlow, Gerrit Smith’s biographer,
Bleeding Kansas had “filled Northern philanthropists and reformers with intense and 
bitter wrath.”85 In 1856, as affairs in Kansas were heating up, Smith sent 250 dollars to 
free-state advocate Amos Lawrence, writing that “much as I abhor war, I nevertheless
Q/r
believe, that there are instances in which the shedding of blood is unavoidable.” This 
was a radical departure from his earlier statements about peaceful means of resistance.
Furthermore, in an 1856 speech in Buffalo, New York, Smith presented his 
resolution that “armed men must be sent to Kansas to conquer the armed men, who come
81 Union, November 20, 1850, quoted in Edelstein, 106.
82 Parker, The Trial o f  Theodore Parker, 203.
83 [Howe], Letters and Journals, 2:269.
84 Union, November 20, 1850, quoted in Edelstein, 105-106.
85 Harlow, “Gerrit Smith,” 33.
86 Gerrit Smith to Amos Lawrence, February 3, 1854, Amos A. Lawrence Letters, Massachusetts Historical 
Society, quoted in Harlow, Gerrit Smith, 345.
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against her.”87 Although political means could still make it a free state, “if our brethren 
in Kansas can be protected only by the shedding of blood, then blood must be shed.’
Smith blamed the American people for slavery’s continued existence, stating that “there 
was not virtue enough in the American people to bring slavery to a bloodless 
termination:—and all that now remains for them is to bring it to a bloody one.”89
Theodore Parker made similar statements in a letter to Charles Sumner written in 
1856. The war against the slave power in Kansas “is not by ballots but bullets. Just now 
the Border ruffians are driven back. It is only for a moment. They will return.”90 A few 
months later he recorded in his journal the departure of emigrants for Kansas. “What a 
comment were the weapons of that company on the boasted democracy of America!
These rifles and pistols were to defend their soil from the American government, which 
wishes to plant slavery in Kansas!”91 While visiting Kansas, Thomas Higginson 
applauded free-state General James Lane and his men, who “had driven out the 
Missourians in all directions,” and he was immensely pleased when Lane gave him a 
commission in the free-state army.92 Higginson and Parker clearly supported these men’s 
efforts at forceful resistance.
These six men, along with other abolitionists, shifted from a pacifist abolitionist 
stance to one of radical violence against the slave power, expressing these beliefs with 
actions—such as work for the Kansas cause—as well as through rhetorical channels.
This shift was largely due to their first-hand experiences and personal contact with
87 Kansas State Historical Society, “Speech o f  Gerrit Smith in the Kansas Convention in Buffalo, July 10, 
1856” Territorial Kansas Online, http://www.territorialkansasonline.org, 1.
88 “Gerrit Smith in the Kansas Convention,” 2.
89 “Gerrit Smith in the Kansas Convention,” 1.
90 Parker, Life and Correspondence o f  Theodore Parker, 2:159.
91 Parker, Life and Correspondence o f  Theodore Parker, 2:160.
92 [Higginson], le tters  and Journals, 143-144. Although this commission was most likely for ceremonial 
purposes only, it does demonstrate Higginson’s desire to become actively involved in the Kansas struggle.
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fugitive slaves and struggling Northern emigrants, experiences which came out of their 
involvement with vigilance committees and emigrant aid societies. These experiences 
gave a personal face to the abolitionist cause, a face which inspired and encouraged them 
to wage war in behalf of the enslaved.
This growing belief in righteous violence appealed to abolitionists’ understanding 
of higher law, demonstrating that “strong peace men could become receptive to force
QTwhen that force appeared compatible with their missionary sense of righteousness.” 
According to historian Lawrence Friedman, these first-generation immediatists felt 
strongly compelled to reconcile the seemingly disparate doctrines of Christian peace and 
righteous warfare against a sinful institution.94 One instance of “righteous” rhetoric can 
be found in an 1852 letter Samuel Howe wrote to his friend Charles Sumner concerning 
one of Sumner’s Senate speeches. It reads: “you will use all moral means, but you will 
never use force—you will have no wars. Against this, again, all the instincts of my 
nature revolt. God gives us power, force, and the instinct to use it, and though it is better 
never to use it in war, yet it may be the only means in our power to save the perishing.”95 
Religious undertones aside, the Secret Six and other abolitionist reformers 
embraced every opportunity to use their oratorical and literary skills, recognizing that 
violent rhetoric and violent actions must work in concert to change American attitudes 
toward slavery. Theodore Parker employed violent rhetoric in 1856, saying “I am more 
than ever of the opinion that we must settle this question in the old Anglo-Saxon way— 
with the sword”96 From the 1830s to the 1850s, Parker published various lectures and
93 Friedman, 203.
94 Friedman, 208.
95 Richards, Samuel Gridley Howe, 205.
96 Parker, Life and Correspondence o f  Theodore Parker, 2:191.
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sermons on the evils of slavery, its status in the Constitution, and its immoral treatment of 
blacks. Even earlier in the 1830s, Gerrit Smith had begun publishing a series of essays
, . . .  97on slavery, which were structured as printed letters to an individual or group. Samuel 
Howe took a somewhat different approach by organizing and editing The
98Commonwealth, a vitriolic abolitionist paper which began circulation in 1851. The 
world of print provided ample opportunity for the Six to expound upon their radical 
abolitionist beliefs and convert others to their cause.
Similarly, several of the Secret Six were frequently in the public eye during the 
1840s and 1850s, giving speeches or lectures at rallies and abolitionist meetings. Parker 
was well acquainted with prominent individuals, receiving materials and papers which he 
appropriated for lectures and his sermons at the Congregational Society of Boston." 
Likewise, Gerrit Smith contributed regularly to meetings of various local societies, 
gaining a reputation as a public speaker.100 Frederick Douglass, who was his close 
friend, often mentioned Smith’s assistance in organizing abolitionist events.101 
Furthermore, after his election to the House of Representatives in 1854, Smith was able 
to use the House floor as an abolitionist soapbox. In his speech on the Kansas-Nebraska 
Bill, a spectacular 101 pages, he painstakingly outlined why he opposed its passage, 
arguing that “the Constitution, the only law of the territories, is not in favor of slavery, 
and that slavery cannot be set up under it.”102 By publicly discussing the role of violence
97 Harlow, Gerrit Smith, 132.
98 Richards, Samuel Gridley Howe, 199.
99 Parker, Life and Correspondence o f  Theodore Parker, 2:68.
100 Harlow, Gerrit Smith, 284.
101 [Frederick Douglass], The Life and Writings o f  Frederick Douglass, vol. 2, Pre-Civil War Decade, 
1850-1860, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: International Publishers, 1950). This volume includes 
numerous letters from Douglass to Smith, thanking him for his financial support, his attendance at 
abolitionist meetings, etc.... Clearly Smith was involved extensively.
102 [Gerrit Smith], Speeches o f  Gerrit Smith in Congress (New York: Mason Brothers, 1856), 121.
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in abolitionism, these men fostered a greater awareness of violent tactics and implored 
other abolitionists to consider the limitations o f non-violent resistance to slavery.
After the Fugitive Slave Law, Bleeding Kansas, and similar events (like the 
caning of Charles Sumner in 1856), these men were prepared to fight; as Julia Ward
I  A 'J
Howe wrote in 1856, “New England spunk seems to be pretty well up.” Gerrit Smith 
agreed, stating that when slavery “begins to march its conquering bands into the Free 
States, I and ten thousand other peace men are not only ready to have it repulsed with 
violence, but pursued even unto death, with violence.”104 The Six had all been involved 
in the anti-slavery movement prior to their relationship with John Brown. This practical 
experience, in addition to their contact with the violence they saw as inherent in the slave 
system, had primed them for an alliance with Brown. The Six agreed to finance his raid 
on Harper’s Ferry (and other abolitionist ventures) to express their moral outrage, 
drawing generously on their newly developed attitudes toward violent means.105 These 
men were willing to condone Brown’s raid, which was considered by the state of Virginia 
a treasonous act, for the cause of liberty. In an eerily prophetic letter to Thomas 
Higginson, written in February 1858, Franklin Sanborn stated confidently that “treason 
will not be treason much longer, but patriotism.”106 The Secret Six were indeed 
“treasonous patriots.”
103 J.W. Howe to Sisters, May 29, 1856, Samuel Gridley Howe Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard, quoted 
in Schwartz, 204.
104 Harlow, Gerrit Smith, 350.
105 Rossbach, 268.
106 Franklin Sanborn to Thomas Wentworth Higginson, February 11, 1858, Higginson-Brown Manuscripts, 
Boston Public Library, quoted in Edelstein, 209.
CHAPTER II
INSURRECTION: HARPER’S FERRY AND ITS AFTERMATH
“John Brown has died, but the life o f  Freedom , fro m  his death, shall f lo w  fo rth  to this nation. ”
J. Sella  M artin, 1859
The Plan Develops
“Rail Road business on a somewhat extended scale; is the identical object for 
which I am trying to get means,” wrote John Brown to his abolitionist ally and future 
member of the Secret Six, Thomas Wentworth Higginson. Brown had a past history with 
the underground railroad, stating that “I have been connected with that business as 
commonly conducted from my boyhood: & never let an opportunity slip.”1 It was 1858; 
violence in Kansas had settled down to a slight murmur, the territory was securely in anti­
slavery hands, and John Brown now looked southward to continue his assault on slavery. 
The raid on Harper’s Ferry would be the culmination of his life’s work and, due to 
assistance from prominent Northerners such as the Secret Six, it would also be 
remembered as the largest practical expression of militant abolitionism.
Brown set his sights for his “railroad business” on the “Great Black Way,” a 
section of the Allegheny Mountains that Harriet Tubman and other underground railroad 
conductors frequently used as a secure route to freedom. His target would be Harper’s
1 John Brown to Thomas Wentworth Higginson, February 12, 1858, Thomas W. Higginson Papers, Boston 
Public Library, quoted in Stephen B. Oates, To Purge This Land with Blood: A Biography o f John Brown 
(Amherst, MA. University o f  Massachusetts Press, 1984), 227.
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Ferry, a small town at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers on the 
border between Virginia and Maryland. Nestled in a valley, Harper’s Ferry was the home 
of a federal arsenal with enough weapons to supply Brown’s anti-slavery force. 
Furthermore, Brown had researched census returns in Jefferson County, where Harper’s 
Ferry was located, discovering that the free black population equaled the slave 
population; Brown believed these free blacks could be integral to his plan. Through his 
conversations with Harriet Tubman, he also learned that slave escapes were common in 
the area, since Jefferson County lay directly on the Maryland border, only thirty miles 
south of Pennsylvania.3
Taking these factors into consideration, Brown determined the details of his plan. 
He had been drumming up support from sympathetic Northerners during 1857 and 1858, 
for a time leaving a small contingent of his men under the supervision of Colonel Hugh 
Forbes who, at the pay rate of one hundred dollars a month, was hired to turn these 
recruits into a well-organized fighting force. Brown intended to take this select group 
into the Allegheny Mountains to establish a fort that could serve as a base of operations. 
They would load this base with the weapons taken from the Harper’s Ferry arsenal.
Then, squads of five would spread out from this central location, bringing in slaves and
2 W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, John Brown, new ed. (Philadelphia: George W. Jacobs, 1909; repr., New York: 
International Publishers, 1974), 153-154. After the reorganization o f  the military in 1821, Secretary o f War 
John C. Calhoun, in response to growing fears o f slave uprisings, deployed one artillery company to each 
arsenal in the slave states. Merton Dillon discusses this issue in Slavery Attacked: Southern Slaves and 
Their Allies, 1619-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 130-132. By guarding 
arsenals, slave revolts would be almost impossible, since these weapons would remain in white hands only. 
This decision had a direct bearing on Brown’s plans for Harper’s Ferry— he knew that he would not be able 
to foment a slave uprising if  he had no way to provide these slaves with weapons. Brown and his men 
already had accumulated enough weapons for themselves; they attacked the armory to procure weapons for 
expected black recruits.
3 John Stauffer, The Black Hearts o f  Men: Radical Abolitionists and the Transformation o f Race 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 255.
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local free blacks to serve as freedom fighters.4 These militiamen would augment the 
underground railroad by helping large groups of slaves escape to the North. Besides 
aiding slaves, Brown also wanted to destabilize the South and shake the core of the slave 
system.5 Ideally, his supporters in the North would fund this enterprise and aid these 
refugees on their journey to Canada. One of his primary objectives was also to involve 
free blacks in the North and in Canada; after the first raid, he could look to these black
/T
communities for monetary aid and recruits for his militia.
In early 1858, Brown went to Frederick Douglass’s home, taking this time to 
write his Provisional Constitution and Ordinances for the People o f  the United States and 
to consult with his respected colleague. In order to fairly govern his fort in the 
Alleghenies, Brown took great care with this constitution, believing that strict 
organization would keep order and avoid anarchy; consequently, he included a 
declaration of loyalty to the U.S. government and the flag, and he instituted a strong 
moral code prohibiting profanity, drunkenness and fornication.7
After an initial meeting between Franklin Sanborn and John Brown in February 
1858, Sanborn consulted Gerrit Smith and informed Samuel Howe, Theodore Parker,
4 According to David Potter, this is where Brown made a major miscalculation. Potter writes that “the 
paradox lay in the fact that the white abolitionists believed that the Negroes were all on the brink o f a 
massive insurrection, yet they seldom consulted any Negro for corroboration” (“Paradox o f Leadership,”
151). Brown, as well as other radical abolitionists, simply assumed that slaves were eager to rise up, thus 
failing to consider that slaves were more discerning in their acceptance o f rebellion. Slaves had seen the 
repercussions o f similar uprisings and were not always willing to take such a risk. For more on this 
discussion, see David Potter, “John Brown and the Paradox o f Leadership Among American Negroes” in 
Blacks in the Abolitionist Movement, ed. John H. Bracey, Jr., August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick, 149-159 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1971). Also see Dillon, Slavery Attacked, 231-232. Dillon believes 
that most slaves were more inclined to attempt escape than to fight for their freedom.
5 Louis A. DeCaro, Jr., “Fire from  the Midst o f  You A Religious Life o f John Brown (New York: New  
York University Press, 2002), 245.
6 Du Bois, 185. Du Bois notes that this technique for running off slaves demonstrates Brown’s knowledge 
o f the maroon communities that already existed in the South, although Brown augmented the maroon idea 
by using these secret bases as a headquarters for the underground railroad.
7 DeCaro, 245.
41
Thomas Higginson, and George Steams of Brown’s plan. All except Smith, who had 
already committed himself to Brown’s cause, met on March 4, 1858, in the American 
House in Boston so Brown could speak in greater detail and answer any possible 
objections. Although they did not know the site of the attack, this Secret Committee of 
Six, as Sanbom called it, agreed to support Brown, electing George Steams as their 
chairman and pledging to raise five hundred to one thousand dollars. They further agreed
o
that no one else should know of this undertaking.
John Brown also divulged his plan to the free black population in Chatham, 
Ontario in 1858 during his first visit to Canada. Chatham was a major terminus on the 
underground railroad, boasting a large free black population—in fact, one third of 
Chatham’s population were fugitives from U.S. authorities. After returning to the United 
States to gather his men, Brown traveled back to Chatham for a convention on May 8 and 
10,1858. About 35 black men attended and were very supportive of Brown’s plan for 
Harper’s Ferry.9
In May 1858, Hugh Forbes, the now-disgruntled associate of Brown, threatened to 
expose Brown’s plan before the first stages had been implemented. He had contacted 
members of the Six, asking for more money and alleging that Brown had not paid him 
enough to support his family still living in Europe. None of the Six had heard of Forbes.
8 Jeffery Rossbach, Ambivalent Conspirators: John Brown, The Secret Six, and a Theory o f  Slave Violence 
(Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 144-146. While he gave most o f his supporters 
little explanation o f  his plans, Brown had divulged specifics to select individuals outside o f the Six. 
According to Richard Realf, a former colleague o f Brown who testified before the Senate Select Committee 
in 1860, “John Brown was a man who would never state more than it was absolutely necessary for him to 
do.” Consequently, while sparse details o f the raid circulated in the months prior to its implementation, 
few had knowledge o f  specifics.
9 DeCaro, 248, 250. Initially, this convention was supposed to meet just before the raid would be carried 
out, so Brown could immediately call on these men for support. However, the Hugh Forbes affair led to 
the raid’s postponement until over a year later which, according to DeCaro, “interrupted the rhythm o f  
cooperation that Brown had attained among black expatriates in 1858” (251).
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Franklin Sanborn did, however, conclude that “he is either a madman or a villain, and in 
either capacity can, and is inclined to, do great mischief.”10 Although Higginson was 
appalled at the idea of delaying the raid, regarding “any postponement as simply 
abandoning the project,” the Six convened without him and agreed to postpone the attack 
until the next year, 1859.11
The secret committee sent Brown to Kansas as a temporary distraction, telling
him to attract attention so Forbes’ disclosure would appear unfounded if it ever reached
1 0the wrong hands. They also agreed to raise another two or three thousand dollars 
during this waiting period, and they gave Brown five hundred dollars and weapons to 
carry back to Kansas. In addition, they asked Brown to avoid telling them any further 
details so they could claim plausible deniability in the event of complications.13
After freeing some Missouri slaves and guiding these twelve fugitives through 
Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Illinois toward safety in Canada, Brown returned to the east 
to finish planning the raid. Throughout the next few months, the Six continued to support 
Brown, even amid some doubts. At times the Six questioned the strategic feasibility of 
the mission, insofar as they were aware of details, and they were anxious to see results 
after making frequent donations to Brown’s work. Theodore Parker was not certain of 
Brown’s success, writing earlier that he doubted “whether things o f the kind will succeed. 
But we shall make a great many failures before we discover the right way of getting at it.
10 Franklin Sanborn to Thomas W. Higginson, May 7, 1858, Thomas W. Higginson Papers, Boston Public 
Library, quoted in Edward Renahan, Jr., The Secret Six: The True Tale o f  the Men Who Conspired with 
John Brown (New York: Crown Publishers, 1995), 151.
11 Thomas W. Higginson to Theodore Parker, May 9, 1858, Theodore Parker Papers, Boston Public 
Library, quoted in Renahan, 152.
12 Oates, 248-251. Forbes had threatened to sell the story to the New York Herald, but ultimately settled on 
contacting several Northern congressmen about the matter, including Henry Wilson, William Seward, and 
Charles Sumner, who all quietly informed the Six o f this unwanted publicity.
13 Renahan, 163.
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This may as well be one of them.”14 Thomas Higginson, like Parker, had some initial 
reservations and was somewhat skeptical o f Brown, referring to him as the “sly old 
veteran.”15
Still, the Secret Six admired Brown, respecting him as a man of character, and 
they continued to place their confidence in this Kansas soldier. Only a few months 
before the raid, Higginson reassured Brown, writing: “I have perfect confidence in you. 
All you do will be well done.”16 Clearly Higginson had overcome his earlier doubts. 
Likewise, in a letter to John Murray Forbes, Samuel Howe vouched for Brown’s 
character, saying that “under his natural and unaffected simplicity and modesty there is 
an irresistible propensity to war upon injustice and wrong.... So far as one man can 
answer for another whom he has not known very long and intimately, I can answer for 
Brown’s honesty of purpose.”17 Steams also had faith in Brown, according to his 
testimony after the raid, as he praised Brown’s “courage, prudence, and good 
judgment.”18
14 Theodore Parker, Life and Correspondence o f  Theodore Parker, ed. John Weiss (New York: 1864), 
2:161.
15 Thomas Wentworth Higginson memo, Higginson-Brown Manuscripts, Boston Public Library, quoted in 
Tilden G. Edelstein, Strange Enthusiasm: A Life o f  Thomas Wentworth Higginson (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1968), 213.
16 Thomas W. Higginson to John Brown, May 1, 1859, Higginson-Brown Manuscripts, Boston Public 
Library, quoted in Edelstein, 218.
17 Samuel Howe to John Murray Forbes, February 5, 1859, Sanborn-Brown Material, Houghton Library, 
Harvard, quoted in Renahan, 183.
18 Testimony o f George Luther Steams, Report o f  the Select Committee o f  the Senate Appointed to Inquire 
into the Late Invasion and Seizure o f  the Public Property at Harper \s Ferry, 36th Congress, 1st Session, no. 
278. Because so many o f the Six destroyed all incriminating documents in their possession that could link 
them to John Brown, it is difficult to uncover evidence o f their confidence in him. Higginson, Smith, 
Howe, and Sanbom clearly expressed their admiration, but Parker and Steams in particular are harder to 
track down. Nevertheless, even if statements about their faith in Brown before the raid are difficult to 
pinpoint, their willingness to continue providing funds proves that they ultimately trusted Brown’s 
judgment and his character. If they had had serious doubts, they would have discontinued their financial 
support.
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FIGURE 2 
JOHN BROWN
(Reprinted from Merrill D. Peterson, John Brown: The Legend Revisited [Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2002])
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Franklin Sanborn, with his propensity for idolizing larger-than-life characters, had 
immediately taken a liking to Brown when they first met in 1857. After this initial 
encounter, Sanborn wrote his friend Thomas Higginson and said: “I like the man from 
what I have seen and his deeds ought to bear witness for him.”19 In another letter to 
Higginson later that year, Sanborn declared that Brown “is as ready for a revolution as 
any other man... [with] a good plan... and a radical purpose.”20 Gerrit Smith’s perception 
of Brown echoes that of Sanborn. Smith wrote to Sanborn in 1858, claiming to have 
“great faith in the wisdom, integrity, and bravery of Captain Brown.... Whenever he 
shall embark in another of these contests I shall again stand ready to help him.”21 The 
Six were willing to underwrite a violent assault against the slave system because of their 
faith in Brown’s judgment, particularly considering his previous work to make Kansas a 
free state. Their involvement in abolition and the Kansas aid movement prepared them to 
endorse this practical application of militant abolition, and they believed Brown was the 
right man for the job.
A Fateful Foray into the South
With the support of the Six boosting his spirits, Brown commenced preliminary 
reconnaissance of the area surrounding Harper’s Ferry. To familiarize his men with the
19 Franklin Sanborn to Thomas W. Higginson, January 5, 1857, Thomas W. Higginson Papers, Boston 
Public Library, quoted in Oswald Garrison Villard, John Brown, 1800-1859: A Biography Fifty Years 
After, rev. ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943), 271. The Six were not certain o f Brown’s involvement 
in the Pottawatomie massacre, which took place in 1856 shortly after border ruffians burned the free-state 
stronghold o f Lawrence, Kansas. Although news o f the massacre had appeared in Northern newspapers, 
Brown had always sidestepped questions about his involvement. Thus, they formed their image o f Brown’s 
role in Bleeding Kansas from more positive examples o f his work, such as his service in the free-state 
militia.
20 Franklin Sanborn to Thomas W. Higginson, September 11, 1857, Thomas W. Higginson Collection, 
Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka.
21 Gerrit Smith to Franklin Sanborn, July 26, 1858, quoted in F[ranklin] B. Sanborn, Recollections o f 
Seventy Years (Boston: Gorham Press, 1909), 1:160-161.
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territory, Brown and his followers moved into a farmhouse across the border in 
Maryland, rented to them by the Kennedy family. Under the assumed name of Isaac 
Smith, Brown mingled freely with the people of Jefferson County, Virginia, and 
neighboring Maryland. He also brought his daughter Anne and his daughter-in-law 
Martha to keep house, hoping to divert suspicions which might be aroused by the number 
of white and black men present on the Kennedy property. Anne and Martha kept up the 
appearance of normalcy by chatting with neighbors who came calling and keeping the 
black recruits hidden from sight.22 Of the twenty-two who participated in the raid, five 
were black men and seven had served in Kansas. They spent their free time at the 
Kennedy farm discussing religion and politics while waiting for the final raiders to 
straggle in.
Finally, on Sunday night, October 16, 1859, Brown and his twenty-one recruits 
marched from the farm in Maryland to Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, across the Potomac 
River. To keep from arousing any suspicion o f an attack, Brown took Lewis Washington 
(great-grand nephew of George Washington) and several other white men captive without 
firing a shot. As Brown’s force entered the town, two of his men cut the telegraph lines 
as the rest took the arsenal and armory buildings.23 Brown took the prisoners with him to 
the arsenal and then sent John E. Cook, C.P. Tidd, William H. Leeman and several 
recruited slaves back to the Kennedy farm to collect the rest of their arms and take them 
to a nearby school building. If all went well at the armory, Brown and his men would 
take the arms from this schoolhouse and fall back to a fortified place in the Alleghenies. 
However, Cook and Leeman procrastinated, taking eleven hours to move two wagon
22 DeCaro, 257.
23 DeCaro, 265-266.
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FIGURE 3
MAP OF HARPER’S FERRY, VIRGINIA
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loads the less than three miles from the Kennedy farm to the schoolhouse, which sat at 
the junction of the Kennedy farm road and the Potomac River. This left Brown and a 
small force to maintain a hold on the town.24 Brown’s men did, however, drum up 
support from neighboring slaves. Some slaves that Brown’s men met along the road 
expressed their interest, saying that “they had been long waiting for an opportunity of the 
kind.”25
To complicate matters, the eastbound Baltimore-Ohio train came through town at 
one in the morning and its passengers noticed the commotion. After some of Brown’s 
men fired on the train, the neighborhood woke up and sounded the alarm. The train was 
delayed for several hours but was set free by sunrise the next day. The train’s passengers 
spread the alarm, throwing warnings written on pieces of paper out the train windows as 
they rode by.26 The entire surrounding area was thrown into confusion. Osborne 
Anderson, one of the white raiders, described it this way: “Men, women and children 
could be seen leaving their homes in every direction; some seeking refuge among 
residents, and in quarters further away; others climbing up the hillsides, and hurrying off 
in various directions.”27
By the next morning, Virginia militiamen had forced Brown to barricade his 
contingent in the engine house of the armory complex. In the evening, when Colonel 
Robert E. Lee and Lieutenant J. E. B. Stuart arrived with United States Marines, Brown
24 Du Bois, 237, According to Du Bois, the raid failed because Brown’s men did not follow his commands 
quickly. Their tardiness led to a siege o f the arsenal while Brown waited for their return, rather than a 
quick “grab-and-go” maneuver. Also, DeCaro argues that their reconnaissance had been faulty, since 
Brown was surprised when the local militia gathered to defend the town— he had not been informed o f their 
existence (264).
25 Osborne P. Anderson, A Voice from Harper's Ferry: A Narrative o f  Events a t H arper’s Ferry; with 
Incidents Prior and Subsequent to its Capture by John Brown and His Men (1861), 33-34, quoted in Du 
Bois, 234.
26 Du Bois, 240.
27 Anderson, 36-37, quoted in Du Bois, 236.
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and six of his men remained alive in the armory—the other raiders had escaped, been 
killed, or had been captured.28 Although Brown tried to negotiate terms of surrender, 
even sending out his own son Watson as an emissary, on October 18, the troops stormed 
the engine house within the armory, slashing the raiders with bayonets and beating
• 29Brown unconscious.
When Brown came back to consciousness, he was lying in shackles outside the 
engine house. After being carried into the armory office, he was peppered with questions 
by the press, militiamen, curious onlookers, and officials such as Virginia’s governor 
Henry Wise and Colonel Robert E. Lee. On October 21, Brown and the surviving raiders 
were transported to nearby Charlestown, Virginia. During his stay in prison, Brown 
responded to the outpouring of correspondence he received, understanding that his 
actions had providentially placed him on a nationwide soapbox to promote discussion 
about abolishing slavery through violent means. Throughout his incarceration he 
diligently maintained that his only goal was to help slaves escape to the North, and that 
he had wanted to avoid shedding white blood at all costs. His conduct while imprisoned 
led many, including Governor Wise and William Fellows (a young prison guard), to 
admire his honesty and courage.30
On October 25, Brown was indicted for conspiring to foment insurrection, for 
treason against the Commonwealth of Virginia, and for murder. Brown and his 
remaining men would be tried in a Virginia court, and on November 2, 1859, John 
“Osawatomie” Brown was sentenced to death for committing treason and murder. His 
hanging was scheduled for exactly one month later. In the last statement he wrote before
28 Oates, 290-297.
29 Renahan, 202-203.
30 DeCaro, 270-271.
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his death, he summed up his convictions, writing, “I, John Brown, am now quite certain
 ^1that the crimes of this guilty land will never be purged away but with blood.” He 
advocated violence to the end.
The Public Speaks: Northern and Southern Responses
Public responses to the raid, from both Northerners and Southerners, ranged from 
horror and disgust to profound admiration for Brown’s selflessness and heroism. The fall 
and winter of 1859-1860 proved to be a turbulent season—sectional tensions that had 
been smoldering under the surface gained momentum as both sections of the country 
reaffirmed their position on the slavery question. And, because newspaper accounts often 
presented the most radical positions on either side of the issue, any middle ground shared 
by the American people seemed to be slipping away. Up until this point, the nation had 
looked to compromises to stabilize the delicate balance of power between free and slave 
states. But according to historian Peter Knupfer, by 1859 and 1860, “growing numbers 
of Americans were less interested in cultivating fraternal feeling through gentle language 
and the toleration of dissent than they were in quieting the noise of partisan warfare by 
forcing the other side to shut up.”32
John Brown’s raid contributed to this contentious atmosphere by encouraging 
many Americans to wonder whether violent means might indeed be the best defensive (or 
even offensive) strategy in this ongoing, sectional feud. Thus, both immediate and long­
term reactions to Brown’s assault demonstrate how the American public responded to the
31 Fjranklin] B. Sanborn, The Life and Letters o f  John Brown, Liberator o f  Kansas, and Martyr o f Virginia 
(1885; repr., New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 620.
32 Peter Knupfer, “A Crisis in Conservatism: Northern Unionism and the Harpers Ferry Raid” in His Soul 
Goes Marching On: Responses to John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Raid , ed. Paul Finkelman, 119-148 
(Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia, 1995), 140-141.
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practical expression of militant abolitionism—they had not only heard militant rhetoric, 
but now they had seen militancy in action. These responses demonstrate the true impact 
of the raid by illuminating whether or not militancy was considered acceptable behavior 
by American society.
Immediately after the raid, white Southerners predictably responded in a state of 
panic. According to the Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, the raid 
“created an excitement in our community and throughout the whole length and breadth of 
the country that has scarcely been equaled by any preceding occurrence in the present
'X 3century.” Southerners viewed strangers with suspicion and detained them until they 
could prove their allegiance to the South.34 As historian and biographer Stephen Oates 
writes, “Southern leaders were virtually united in damning the raid as ‘an act of war’ 
perpetrated by ‘murderers, traitors, robbers, [and] insurrectionists’.... The raid was 
indisputably an abolitionist-Republican plot.”35 Fearing slave revolts, Southern states 
called up their militias and began drilling while hysterical white women holed up in their 
houses for fear of being accosted by rebellious slaves. Both slaveholders and non- 
slaveholding whites vowed to resist the subjugation of the South to blood-thirsty 
Northerners who sanctioned murder and treason.36 As for John Brown, the white South 
characterized him as a monomaniac who had lost his grasp of reality.
Black Southerners, in contrast, appear to have supported Brown’s actions at 
Harper’s Ferry. During the raid, neighboring slaves had assisted Brown and his 
compatriots. One of the raiders, Osborne Anderson, recalled that “there were at least one
33 American and Commercial Advertiser, October 20, 1859, quoted in Oates, 307.
34 “The Insurrection at Harper’s Ferry,” New-York Daily Tribune, October 20, 1859.
35 Oates, 320.
36 Oates, 322-323.
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hundred and fifty actively informed slaves,” clearly demonstrating that free blacks and 
slaves were aware of what was happening. According to local accounts, slaves in the 
area began burning their master’s property upon hearing of Brown’s capture. To contain
38this unrest, Governor Wise sent five hundred more troops to Jefferson County.
At first, Northerners responded with mixed emotions to Brown’s attack on the 
arsenal and to these widespread reports of slave unrest. The Harper’s Ferry raid was 
front-page news in every major newspaper in the country—according to Mary Miller of 
Ohio, “John Brown’s name has become a household word.”39 Most Northerners reacted 
with feelings of dismay, seeing the attack as a setback in the struggle for peace between 
North and South, while more radical men and women applauded Brown’s actions.40
Some men and women in the North agreed with Southerners, arguing that Brown 
was a madman who deserved whatever fate Virginia had in store for him. The October 
21st edition of the New York Herald included a statement from Henry Ward Beecher, who 
believed that “unless his (Brown’s) movement was part o f a widespread scheme of 
insurrection, now frustrated by a premature outbreak, it was in every point of view the 
height of madness.”41 Beecher not only called him a madman, but also believed that he 
deserved to be punished for his actions.
37 Stauffer, 256.
38 Stauffer, 257.
39 Mary Miller to Aaron Stevens, February 3, 1860, Richard J. Hinton Papers, Kansas State Historical 
Society, Topeka.
40 Merrill D. Peterson, John Brown: The Legend Revisited (Charlottesville: University o f Virginia Press, 
2002), 11- 12.
41 “The Harper’s Ferry Abolition Outbreak and the Republican Party,” New York Herald, October 21,
1859. In early 20th century biographies o f  John Brown, he is often considered a fanatic with a questionable 
degree o f sanity. James Malin’s John Brown and the Legend o f Fifty-Six (Philadelphia: The American 
Philosophical Society, 1942) is only one such work. Much research has been done in the late 20th and early 
2 1st centuries to reverse this opinion. Stephen Oates’s To Purge This Land with Blood: A Biography o f  
John Brown (Amherst, MA: University o f  Massachusetts Press, 1984) and Louis A. DeCaro, Jr.’s “Fire 
from  the M idst o f  You A Religious Life o f John Brown (New York: New York University Press, 2002) are 
two more balanced portrayals o f this enigmatic individual.
53
Republican Presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln reportedly told an audience 
in Troy, Kansas, that “Old John Brown has been executed for treason against a State. We 
cannot object, even though he agreed with us in thinking slavery wrong. That cannot 
excuse violence, bloodshed, and treason.”42 Samuel J. Kirkwood, governor of Iowa, 
concurred, writing: “I cannot wonder at the most unfortunate and bloody occurrence at 
Harper’s Ferry. But while we may not wonder at it, we must condemn it. It was an act of 
war—of war against brothers.”43 These individuals, like others in the North, did not 
believe that violence was the answer.
Thanks to the carpetbag full of correspondence that Brown left at the Kennedy 
farm, complete with incriminating letters from the Secret Six, Northerners also asked 
who was responsible. Once it became clear that Brown had assistance from prominent 
Northerners, the public drew the connection between violent rhetoric, such as that 
endorsed by radical abolitionists, and violent behavior. This heated discussion of violent 
means allowed abolitionists to evaluate the repercussions of militant abolitionism, 
including its effect on public opinion.44
An early article in the New York Herald singled out Frederick Douglass and 
Gerrit Smith as friends and contributors of John Brown. The same article placed blame 
on black Republicans and Senator William H. Seward, who had spoken of the 
“irrepressible conflict” between North and South.45 Two days later, the Herald ran 
another article, encouraging the laboring man to “examine into the bitter results that may
42 Report by Dr. Wilder, Topeka Capital, October 25, 1908, quoted in Villard, 564.
43 Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Messages and Proclamations o f  the Governors o f  Iowa (Iowa City, IA: 1903), 
2:240-241, quoted in Villard, 567.
44 Knupfer, 140-141.
45 “The Outbreak at Harper’s Ferry— Complicity o f  Leading Abolitionists and Black Republicans,” New 
York Herald, October 20, 1859.
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come home to him if these treasonable preachings and these traitorious practices are not 
nipped in the bud and rooted out forever.”46 In contrast, the New-York Daily Tribune 
placed blame on the South, arguing that “if we were to look beyond the immediate actors 
in that affair, we should say those were responsible who first set on foot and afterward 
encouraged and sustained the Border-Ruffian Pro-Slavery war against the Free-Labor 
settlers of Kansas.”47
Above all, Northerners realized there would be political implications. Harper’s 
Weekly wrote that “it is hardly necessary to add that the event will possess marked 
political significance at the present time. The admitted affiliations between Gerrit Smith 
and old Brown, and the peculiar sympathy expressed for him and his friends by certain 
organs of the Republican party, are likely to increase the vote against the Republican 
candidates this fall.”48 Both Northern and Southern Democrats placed culpability on 
Republican heads, while Republican moderates worked to maintain a relationship with 
Southerners who labeled Brown a crazed lunatic.49
After the raid’s failure, the Secret Six reacted strongly to the possibility that they 
might be implicated in the insurrection. Franklin Sanborn responded by burning 
incriminating correspondence and, along with George Steams, he consulted John A. 
Andrew, a lawyer, about the best course of action. Although Andrew expressed doubts 
about the possibility of their arrest, he did suggest that Sanbom leave the country,
Sanborn left immediately for Canada; he claimed in a letter to his mother that he had 
gone “to prevent the obtaining of information,” but he most likely was avoiding arrest.
46 “The League o f Treason—Practical Organization o f Seward’s Irrepressible Conflict,” New York Herald, 
October 22, 1859.
47 “Who is Responsible?” New-York Daily Tribune, October 21, 1859.
48 “Insurrection at Harper’s Ferry,” Harper's Weekly, October 29, 1859.
49 Oates, 310.
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He returned four days later.50 In early December, Senator James Mason of Virginia, 
chairman of a Senate committee investigating the raid, summoned Sanborn to testify. 
Although the committee only intended to determine whether new legislation should be 
drafted to prevent further insurrection, Sanborn again fled the country.51
Samuel Howe, after an initial moment of panic, attempted to provide for Brown’s 
defense and for an appeal to the court’s ruling, but after Andrew informed the Six of an 
obscure law that could increase their chances of arrest, Howe panicked once again.52 
Exactly one month after the raid’s failure, he publicly denied his involvement in a 
statement published in the New York Tribune. He wrote that “the outbreak at Harper’s 
Ferry was unforeseen and unexpected by me,” and called any attempt to link him to 
Brown an absurdity.53 Like Sanborn, he also fled to Canada, taking George Steams with 
him, but he returned to the United States feeling remorseful. He would later accept the 
summons of the Senate committee, against Sanborn’s advice, to “rectify some mistakes 
or missteps I have made.”54
George Steams, who had also consulted with John A. Andrew, fled to Canada 
alongside Howe. After his return in January, however, he visited John Brown’s wife in 
North Elba, New York, to assure her of continued financial care and support. Also, he 
had not yet received a summons from the Senate committee and therefore intended to
50 Sanborn, Recollections, 1:188.
51 Oates, 314.
52 Harold Schwartz, Samuel Gridley Howe : Social Reformer, 1801-1876 (Cambridge, MA. Harvard 
University Press, 1956), 236. At first, Andrew was confident that the Six could not be arrested for their 
involvement with Brown. However, in mid-November 1859, Andrews came upon a law from 1846 which 
declared, in the words o f Franklin Sanborn, that “a witness whose evidence is decreed material by any U.S. 
judge, may be arrested by a warrant from a judge, without any previous summons and taken before that 
judge.... This leaves no room for a writ o f Habeas Corpus, unless the state judges are willing to take the 
ground that the statute is unconstitutional” (Franklin Sanborn to Thomas W. Higginson, November 13, 
1859, Thomas W. Higginson Papers, Boston Public Library, quoted in Renahan, 225).
53 [Samuel Gridley Howe], Letters and Journals o f Samuel Gridley Howe, ed. Laura E. Richards, notes and 
preface, F. B. Sanborn (Boston: Dana Estes, 1909; repr., New York: AMS Press, 1973) 2:437-438.
54 [Howe], Letters and Journals, 2:442.
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remain near the Canadian border. Yet, like Howe, he did eventually testify before the 
Senate committee, speaking mostly of his involvement in the Massachusetts State Kansas 
Committee.
Gerrit Smith remained in the country, although he suffered a mental breakdown 
shortly after the raid. The New York Herald had printed an article that linked the raid on 
Harper’s Ferry to a letter Smith had written “in which he speaks of the folly o f attempting 
to strike the shackles off the slaves by the force of moral suasion or legal agitation, and 
predicts that the next movement made in the direction of negro emancipation would be an 
insurrection in the South.”55 Upon reading this article, the weight of Smith’s actions fell 
upon him heavily. Smith’s self-critical, sensitive tendencies intensified as he realized 
that he had played a part in the deaths of seventeen men plus the likely deaths of Brown 
and his fellow prisoners. As a reporter for the New York Herald wrote, the recent event 
“has not only impaired his [Smith’s] health but is likely to seriously affect his excitable 
and illy-balanced mind.... His calm, dignified, impressive bearing has given way to a 
hasty, nervous agitation.”56 He had, however, exhibited the presence of mind to destroy 
any evidence linking him to the raid. On November 7,1859, five days after Brown’s 
sentencing, Smith was taken to the New York State Asylum at Utica.57
While in the asylum, Smith, who had been cut off from news about Brown, 
nevertheless remembered the date of Brown’s execution. Without explicitly linking 
himself to the raid, Smith wrote in a letter to his close friend Edwin Morton that “the
35 “Startling News from Virginia and Maryland— Negro Insurrection at Harper’s Ferry— Strange and 
Exciting Intelligence,” Yew York Herald, October 18, 1859.
56 “Gerrit Smith and the Harper’s Ferry Outbreak,” New York Herald, October 31, 1859.
57 Ralph Volney Harlow, “Gerrit Smith and the John Brown Raid” American Historical Review 38 (1932), 
51.
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r o
great and the good go to the noose... only the mean and the treacherous avoid it.” This 
telling statement illuminates how, in the midst of his mental collapse and moral 
wavering, Smith still believed that Brown’s actions had been right.
Thomas Wentworth Higginson, unlike some of the others, showed no signs of 
leaving the country. Instead of panicking, Higginson helped to plan both Brown’s appeal 
and two escape plans to rescue the prisoners, none of which materialized.59 He 
responded negatively to the perceived cowardice of his associates. After Howe published 
his denial, Higginson declared that it would be “the extreme of baseness in us to deny 
complicity with Capt. Brown’s general scheme—while we were not, of course, called 
upon to say anything to criminate [sic] ourselves.”60 Sanborn reacted strongly to 
Higginson’s frustration, writing on November 17, “I can’t see why it is any worse to 
conceal the facts now than before the outbreak, provided that Brown and his men do not 
suffer by such concealment. What has been prudence is prudence still.”61 Nevertheless, 
Higginson had difficulty forgiving the cowardice and selfishness he saw in his fellow 
conspirators.
Theodore Parker’s reaction was much different, since he was living in Italy during 
the events of the raid and its aftermath. His distance from these events gave him a unique 
sense of perspective about Brown’s actions and about the likelihood of slave 
insurrections. He had read accounts of the raid, and although he did not admit his prior 
knowledge, he approved of Brown’s tactics and lamented the death of such a noble hero.
58 Gerrit Smith to Edwin Morton, December 2, 1859, Gerrit Smith Papers, Syracuse University Library, 
quoted in Renahan, 235.
Renahan, 218.
60 Thomas Higginson to Samuel Howe, November 15, 1859, Thomas W. Higginson Papers, Boston Public 
Library, quoted in Harlow, “Gerrit Smith,” 47.
61 Franklin Sanborn to Thomas Higginson, November 17, 1859, Thomas W. Higginson Papers, Boston 
Public Library, quoted in Renahan, 228.
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He declared that “such insurrections will continue as long as slavery lasts, and will 
increase, both in frequency and in power, just as the people become intelligent and moral. 
Virginia may hang John Brown and all that family, but she cannot hang the Human 
Race.”62 He applauded Brown’s actions and firmly believed that “Brown will die, I 
think, like a martyr, and also like a saint.’
These positive statements made by Higginson and Parker were soon echoed by 
many in the North as Brown’s incarceration and trial progressed. This old, weathered 
man from Kansas had such composure, and had uttered such profound words of 
compassion for the downtrodden, that many Northerners could not help admiring his 
courage, faith, and ideals. During his trial, Brown had disclosed his willingness to die for 
the cause: “If it is deemed necessary that I should forfeit my life for the furtherance of the 
ends of justice, and mingle my blood further with the blood of my children and with the 
blood of millions of this Slave-country, whose rights are disregarded by wicked, cruel, 
and unjust enactments, I say let it be done.”64
The most hardened Northern heart that felt little sympathy for slaves was moved 
at the very least by Brown’s passion and conviction for a cause he believed in so deeply. 
His conduct while imprisoned had impressed even Governor Wise, who called Brown “a 
man o f clear head, o f courage, fortitude and simple ingenuousness.”65 Brown’s 
statements during the trial and the letters he wrote while imprisoned (which were 
published in Northern newspapers) led to a shift in Northern sentiment. As Merrill 
Peterson writes, “Such words and feelings helped to change the mind of the North about
62 [Theodore Parker], John Brown’s Expedition Reviewed in a  Letter from  Rev. Theodore Parker, at Rome, 
to Francis Jackson, Boston (Boston: The Fraternity, 1860), 7.
63 John Brown’s Expedition Reviewed, 18.
64 Peterson, 14.
65 Speech by Gov. Henry Wise, October 21, 1859, quoted in Villard, 246.
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John Brown. Lunatic! Fanatic! Incompetent! Traitor! The language of disparagement 
and dishonor that had rained upon Brown immediately after the ill-starred invasion gave 
way to a chorus of respect, admiration, and praise.”66 Many Northerners were 
recognizing the same traits that had first drawn the Secret Six toward an alliance with this 
man, and by praising Brown’s good intentions, they also implicitly condoned the violent 
outcome of his well-meaning empathy for the enslaved.
Consequently, a chorus of approval now rang out from the North. According to 
Frederick Douglass, immediately after the raid “a thrill of horror ran through all the 
country, and the feeling was that he [Brown] had committed a very rash, and in the 
opinion of some, a wicked deed; but when John Brown had had a few days in which to 
explain his plans and purposes... a reaction occurred at once. It was found that John 
Brown was not mad—that he was not even wicked—but that he was a noble, heroic, and 
Christian martyr.67
Those who had feared to speak in Brown’s favor now felt comfortable expressing 
their true opinion of the raid, and many who had previously sneered in derision became 
converts to his cause. James Redpath, a Northern journalist and colleague of Brown’s 
from his Kansas days, continued to steadfastly support his dear friend: “Living bravely, 
dying, he will teach us courage. A Samson in his life, he will be a Samson in his death. 
Let cowards ridicule and denounce him; let snake-like journalists hiss at his holy
66 Peterson, 17.
67 Frederick Douglass, “John Brown and the Slaveholders’ Insurrection: An Address Delivered in 
Edinburgh, Scotland, on 30 January 1860,” in The Frederick Douglass Papers: Series One; Speeches, 
Debates, and Interviews , vol. 2, ed. John W. Blassingame, 312-322 (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1985), 315.
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failure—for one, I do not hesitate to say that I love him, admire him, and defend him.
God Bless Him!”68
Thaddeus Hyatt, president of the National Kansas Committee, wrote to Brown,
saying “Your courage, my brother, challenges the admiration of men—your faith, the
admiration of angels!—Be steadfast to the end!”69 Hyatt would later serve time in jail for
refusing the summons of the Senate committee called to investigate the raid. During a
lecture, Ralph Waldo Emerson likened Brown to the Messiah, saying his death “will
make the gallows glorious like the Cross.”70 A fellow transcendentalist, Henry David
Thoreau, said that “it was his [Brown’s] peculiar doctrine that a man has a perfect right to
interfere by force with the slaveholder, in order to rescue the slave. I agree with him.”71
Hannah Maxson’s eloquent letter to Aaron Stevens, one of the incarcerated
raiders, described how at least one Northerner believed that these followers of Brown
were “the noblest of the noble.” Maxson wrote:
Death will have no sting, neither can the grave claim a victory. Oh! Tis a glorious 
thought to us, to know that tyrants cannot crush you by their barbarism... the great 
law of progression will soon thunder forth the edict—“Thus far shalt thou go, but 
no further;” ... and when in your bright spirit home you shall look down and 
behold the work which your efforts ushered into life, you will thank God that you 
lived and died.72
Clearly Maxson believed that the actions of Stevens, Brown, and the other raiders would 
have far-reaching consequences for the progress of emancipation.
68 Boston Atlas & Daily Bee, October, 24, 1859, quoted in Edelstein, 226.
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Maxson’s conviction certainly rang true with many Northerners. A free black 
woman from Indiana drafted a letter to Brown, saying, “I thank you, that you have been 
brave enough to reach out your hands to the crushed and blighted of my race.... We may 
earnestly hope that your fate will not be a vain lesson, that it will intensify our hatred of 
Slavery and love of freedom.”73 In a letter to Aaron Stevens, one of the incarcerated 
raiders, Mary Miller of Ohio wrote: “Sir you have shamed us into action—henceforth 
(God helping us) we will do with all our might what our heart and hands find to do in 
liberating, and elevating oppressed millions.”74 These women were encouraged to stand 
against slavery, and by applauding the efforts o f Brown and his men, many Northerners 
tacitly accepted that violence could bring the nation one step closer to emancipation. 
While this realization was new to many in the North, it was not new to the Secret Six.
Abolitionists, like their fellow Northerners, applauded the work of Brown and his 
associates at Harper’s Ferry, recognizing the long-term benefits of the raid. Prominent 
anti-slavery individuals embraced this opportunity to establish Brown as a martyr for 
their cause, sensing that the growth of anti-slavery sentiment required the inspirational 
heroism of a man like John Brown. One such abolitionist was Henry Ward Beecher, who 
clearly disapproved of Brown’s tactics but still took advantage of this opportunity to 
promote abolitionist ideas. In a sermon, Beecher proclaimed, “Let no man pray that 
Brown be spared. Let Virginia make him a martyr. His soul was noble, his work 
miserable. But a cord and gibbet will redeem all that and round up Brown’s failure with
73 F.E.W. to John Brown, November 25, 1859, in Echoes o f H arper’s Ferry, ed. James Redpath (Boston: 
Thayer and Eldridge, 1860), 418-419.
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a heroic success.”75 Henry David Thoreau concurred, stating eloquently, “I almost fear 
that I may yet hear of his deliverance, doubting if a prolonged life, if any life, can do as 
much good as his death.”76
Men and women across the North mourned Brown’s death on December 2, 1859. 
Buildings in Cleveland, Ohio, were draped in black, and in Boston, where all black
77businesses were closed for the day, free blacks wore black armbands. In Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, black public school teachers did not hold classes.78 Newspapers and 
magazines published poems and elegies dedicated to the old warrior, and numerous cities 
across the North called prayer meetings. In Concord, Massachusetts, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Bronson Alcott held a ceremony with poetry 
readings and a dirge written by Franklin Sanborn.79
Stunned by the outpouring of support for Brown, which had been dramatically 
portrayed in the media, men and women in the South felt they had been betrayed by their 
fellow countrymen. Southerners could not understand how a white man could kill other 
whites on behalf of the black race, and they were especially dumbfounded by the idea 
that other white men could support such violent action against the South. Fearing that the 
North was usurping federal power and turning it against the South, many white 
Southerners believed that the North was “teeming with ‘mad John Browns’” who 
preached a doctrine of hate that would lead to an invasion of the South and slave 
insurrection. To prevent slave uprisings that might be encouraged by Brown’s attack,
75 Otto J. Scott, The Secret Six: John Brown and the Abolitionist Movement (New York: Times Books, 
1979), 303.
76 Peterson, 17.
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they began placing further restrictions on their slaves’ movements, censoring mail, and 
driving Northerners out of their communities.80
Furthermore, the South began to keep a tight reign on their free black population. 
In one instance, according to an article in the National Era, “Judge Crain, together with 
the concurrence of the grand jury of Charles county [Maryland], [is] withdrawing all 
licenses granting to the free colored persons the use of fire-arms, and also authorizing the 
sheriff and constables to search for and seize upon such arms.”81 The intense wave of 
Northern support for Brown had inundated the press to such a degree that Southerners 
became certain that all Northerners and Southern free blacks were out for blood.
Nathaniel Cabell, a Virginian from Nelson County, expressed this sense of 
betrayal in a letter to Henry S. Randall, a friend from New York. He wrote, “they 
[Northerners] have remained, in a degree, passive, while the immense tide of calumny 
against the Institutions and People of the South have been flowing apace.”62 Similar 
sentiments were uttered by other Southerners. According to a New York Tribune reporter 
writing from Petersburg, Virginia, a leading lawyer from the community exclaimed, “I 
would be glad to see the whole North sink to the deepest depth of the bottomless pit! 
Damn her!”83
The anti-abolitionist feeling in Kentucky provides another example of this 
Southern attitude. According to an article in the National Era, thirty-six Kentuckians 
from Madison County were asked to leave the state after expressing their abolitionist 
leanings. The article attributes this directly to John Brown, stating that “it appears there
80 Scott, 309.
81 “Disarming o f Colored Persons,” National Era, December 22, 1859.
82 Nathaniel Cabell to Henry S. Randall, January 6, 1860, Nathaniel Cabell Papers, Virginia Historical 
Society, Richmond, quoted in Peterson, 19.
83 New-York Tribune, November 29, 1859, quoted in Peterson, 18.
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has been much excitement in the county since John Brown’s Harper’s Ferry raid, and that 
the parties above referred to left in consequence of resolutions passed by a large county 
meeting, giving them ten days to depart the state, or abide the consequences.”84
Unlike their white neighbors, it appears that Southern blacks admired John Brown 
and fully supported the raid on Harper’s Ferry, even if their appreciation was not 
publicized by the press. Blacks continued to destroy their owners’ property, and one 
group of slaves in Maryland rioted, forcing a westbound train to stop at their behest. On 
the day of Brown’s execution, slaves burned the farm of a notoriously vicious slaveholder 
(who had died in the raid) and poisoned his family’s livestock. The raid also inspired 
slaves in the area around Harper’s Ferry to make an escape—the 1860 census of Jefferson 
County, Virginia, listed a record number of fugitives.85
Free blacks in the North were no different. Charles Langston, a free black from 
Cleveland, Ohio, believed that “Capt. Brown was engaged in no vile, base, sordid, 
malicious or selfish enterprise. His aims and ends were lofty, noble, generous, 
benevolent, humane and Godlike. His actions were in perfect harmony with, and resulted 
from the teaching of the Bible.”86 Elsewhere, in New York, a group of black women 
wrote to Brown’s widow, Mary, saying, “We wanted to tell you how we have met again 
and again in prayer for you, and those who are still in bonds, and how, in offering this 
word of sympathy to you now we desire to express our deep, undying gratitude to him 
who has given his life so freely to obtain for us our defrauded rights.”87 Besides these
84 “Abolitionists Ordered to Leave Kentucky,” National Era, January 5, 1860.
85 DeCaro, 275.
86 Charles Langston, letter to the editor, Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 18, 1859, in Blacks on John 
Brown, 12.
87 “Letter to the Wife o f  John Brown,” The Weekly Anglo-African, December 17, 1859, in Blacks on John 
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two instances, blacks throughout the North held prayer meetings and rallies to express 
their admiration and support for their abolitionist heroes.
By all estimations, the Harper’s Ferry raid had implications that reached far past 
Brown’s expectations. Senator Henry Seward had spoken of an “irrepressible conflict” 
that would tear apart North and South, a concept which some radical abolitionists 
embraced, but no one had expected Old John Brown to play such an integral role in the 
Union’s demise. Although Seward’s “irrepressible conflict” was a phrase well known to 
many by 1859, Brown’s raid convinced the nation that this conflict was not far off.
While conservative politicians tried to broker a rapprochement between the two sides, 
many, particularly blacks, felt this was impossible. An editorial in Douglass ’ Monthly 
likened such a compromise to putting “new wine to old bottles, new cloth to old 
garments.... To attempt them as a means of peace between freedom and slavery is as to 
attempt to reverse irreversible law.”88
Southerners also saw the future of relations between North and South. General 
James Kemper of the Virginia General Assembly urged his state to “stand forth as one 
man and say to fanaticism, in her own language, whenever you advance a hostile foot 
upon our soil, we will welcome you with bloody hands and hospitable graves.”89 
According to the Richmond Enquirer, “the Harper’s Ferry invasion has advanced the 
cause of Disunion more than any other event that has happened since the formation of the 
Government.”90
Northerners responded to this firm Southern posture by recognizing the disparities 
between their worldview and that of their Southern neighbors. Brown’s raid had forced
88 Quarles, Black Abolitionists, 248.
89 Oates, 323-324.
90 Richmond Enquirer, October 25, 1859, quoted in Oates, 323.
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neutral observers to choose—there could be no more sitting on the fence. One instance 
of a newfound unity among Northerners was found in Peterboro, New York, Gerrit 
Smith’s hometown. After the raid, there were rumors about Smith’s impending arrest as 
an accomplice. When a New York reporter traveled to Peterboro for the story, he found 
that the town’s residents were overwhelmingly protective of Smith. Even though some 
disagreed with his abolitionist and temperance beliefs, they respected Smith and 
remained loyal to him throughout the raid’s aftermath. One Mr. Farrell, an anti­
abolitionist who ran the Oneida depot hotel, said Smith was “every man’s friend, and 
when that’s so, it is difficult to make people consent to let such a man be arrested and 
taken off to another State.”91 Sam Russell, a former slave and current employee of the 
Smith family, felt assured that the local black community would “lose their lives before 
their benefactor should be taken from his home.”92 Already, Peterboro’s inhabitants had 
united against a common foe who threatened their neighbor and friend.
Beyond helping to unite the North in a common cause, the raid on Harper’s Ferry 
unified abolitionists and gave the movement renewed strength and confidence. 
Abolitionists who had previously adopted a pacifist stance became aware that violence 
was a powerful weapon against slavery. More important, they came to understand how 
violent actions and violent rhetoric were seen in the public eye. Because violent means 
were becoming more acceptable in many Northern circles, and because Harper’s Ferry 
had polarized the nation, abolitionists realized that new techniques (some of them 
violent) might become necessary. In many ways, the public’s move toward violent 
means mirrors the radical abolitionists’ shift toward violent abolitionism—many
91 New York Herald, November 2, 1859, quoted in Stauffer, 239.
92 Ibid.
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abolitionists converted to militancy because of the injustices they found in the Fugitive 
Slave Law and Bleeding Kansas, just as many in the North were ready to accept violence 
after the Harper’s Ferry affair.
Even William Lloyd Garrison, famed pacifist and leader of the Boston abolitionist 
movement, had to recognize Brown’s status as a hero for abolition. In the Liberator, 
Garrison wrote that Brown “is as deserving of high-wrought eulogy as any who ever 
wielded sword or battle-axe in the cause of liberty; but we do not and cannot approve any 
indulgence in the war spirit.”93 Garrison was willing to recognize Brown’s success as an 
anti-slavery agitator, and to acknowledge that violent means attributed to that success, 
even as he felt compelled to disapprove of violence as an anti-slavery tool.
Moreover, a speech given by J. Sella Martin at the Martyr’s Day celebration in 
Boston demonstrated that free blacks “approve the means that John Brown has used... in 
America, means have been used for white men and... John Brown has used his means for 
black men.”94 At a meeting in Detroit on that same day, December 2, 1859, free blacks 
resolved “to concentrate our efforts in keeping the Old Brown liberty-ball in motion and 
thereby continue to kindle the fires of liberty upon the altar of every determined heart 
among men.”95 As in the case of white abolitionists, Brown’s raid promoted more talk of 
violence within black abolitionist circles and encouraged these reformers to work 
steadfastly for emancipation.
93 Renahan, 112.
94 “Speech o f Rev. J. S. Martin,” The Liberator, December 9, 1859, in Blacks on John Brown, 27.
95 “Meeting in Detroit,” The Weekly Anglo-African, December 17, 1859, in Blacks on John Brown, 22.
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Continuing in the Cause
Clearly, the Secret Six occupied a unique position during the precarious peace 
that existed after the raid, having to respond to accusations about their complicity. All of 
them, with the exception of Thomas Higginson and Theodore Parker, lost face and sought 
to distance themselves from John Brown. However, even as they denied their prior 
knowledge of the raid, they did not necessarily deny the usefulness of violent means or 
their previous relationship with Brown.
Theodore Parker died in early 1860 of tuberculosis, and thus had few 
opportunities to comment extensively on insurrection and violent abolitionist tactics. 
However, in a letter written November 24, 1859, Parker reaffirmed his belief in violence 
and outlined the main points of his abolitionist creed. First, “a man held against his will 
as a slave has a natural right to kill everyone who seeks to prevent his enjoyment of 
liberty.”96 In addition, “the freeman has a natural right to help the slaves recover their
liberty, and in that enterprise to do for them all which they have a right to do for
Q7
themselves.” Parker continued to support violent means, writing, “a few years ago it 
did not seem difficult first to check Slavery, and then to end it without any bloodshed. I 
think this cannot be done now, nor ever in the future. A ll the great charters of H u m a n it y  
have been writ in blood.”98
Thomas Higginson also remained a constant advocate o f violent abolitionist 
techniques. In 1861, just as the Civil War began, Higginson wrote two articles for the 
Atlantic Monthly, one focusing on the Denmark Vesey slave revolt and the other on Nat 
Turner’s rebellion; both disparaged the “Uncle Tom” stereotype in favor of more militant
96 John Brown’s Expedition Reviewed, 4.
97 John Brown’s Expedition Reviewed, 5.
98 Theodore Parker to Francis Jackson, November 24, 1859, in Echoes, 77.
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figures like Turner. Higginson acknowledged that war would be terrible, but “the rising 
of slaves in case of continued war, is a mere destiny.”99 In his typical swashbuckling 
style, Higginson was ready for a good fight. He found his chance while serving as 
commander of a black army regiment during the Civil War.
Although Samuel Gridley Howe was less enthusiastic about violence after the 
raid, he still admired Brown’s actions at Harper’s Ferry. He did vacillate, however, 
between outright terror of arrest and pride in his relationship with Brown. Howe agreed 
to testify before the Senate committee, but he still tried to walk the fine line between 
supporting violence in theory and acknowledging that he funded an attack on the South.
In his testimony, Howe did reaffirm his beliefs about free-state resistance in Kansas. “If 
the polls for instance, at an election were surrounded by armed men from other States, 
and the freemen o f Kansas were prevented by fear from voting, I should call the man who 
attempted to repel those invaders a defender of freedom.”100 Samuel Howe still agreed 
with the physical resistance employed by free-state Kansans, acknowledging the 
necessity of violence in that context.
While Howe was not entirely comfortable with his decision to embrace violent 
tactics, it is clear that he still advocated these techniques to a certain degree. He wrote to 
Theodore Parker in March 1860, saying, “You, who study human nature, will expect that 
Brown’s example will inspire others with the thought and the purpose of trying again 
what he died in attempting, and you will not be disappointed. The next blow will be felt 
where least apprehended, and will probably have a result even greater than that of the
99 Thomas Wentworth Higginson to J.T. Fields, June 2, 1861, Thomas W. Higginson Manuscripts, 
Houghton Library, Harvard, quoted in Edelstein, 246.
100 Testimony o f Samuel Howe, Report o f the Select Committee o f  the Senate Appointed to Inquire into the 
Late Invasion and Seizure o f  the Public Property a t Harper's Ferry, 36th Congress, 1st Session, no. 278.
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first.”101 In a letter to Charles Sumner in 1861, Howe wrote that “we have entered upon a 
struggle which ought not to be allowed to end until the slave power is completely 
subjugated, and emancipation made certain.”102 Although these statements do not 
blatantly condone violence, they do imply that Howe believed slavery would not die a 
peaceful death.
Samuel Howe, like some other members of the Secret Six, remained active in the 
abolitionist cause, participating in the emancipation movement and working for the 
Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, the precursor to the Freedmen’s Bureau.103 In 1863, as 
an agent of this commission, Howe traveled to free black settlements in Canada to 
investigate the character and condition o f emancipated slaves. In their preliminary report, 
Howe and his colleagues determined that these men and women “lack[ed] no essential 
aptitude for civilization,” and asked that “all colored refugees be treated with justice and 
humanity.”104 Howe made similar statements in a letter to naturalist Louis Agassiz, 
writing that “I would not only advocate entire freedom, equal rights and privileges [but 
also] open competition for social distinction.”105
Likewise, George Steams did not directly express support for hostile abolitionist 
tactics, although he continued in his anti-slavery work. In his testimony before the 
Senate committee, Steams hesitated to acknowledge whether he approved of its use of 
force, fearing the wrath of pro-slavery members of the committee, stating instead that “I 
should have disapproved of it if I had known of it.” However, immediately after his
101 [Howe], Letters and Journals, 2:448.
102 Schwartz, 252.
103 [Howe], Letters and Journals, 2:502-504.
104 American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, Preliminary Report Touching the Condition and 
Management ofEmancipated Refugees... (New York: JohnF. Trow, 1863), 34, 18.
105 Samuel Howe to Louis Agassiz, August 3, 1863, quoted in James M. McPherson, “A Brief for Equality: 
The Abolitionist Reply to the Racist Myth, 1860-1865” in The Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the 
Abolitionists, ed. Martin Duberman, 156-177 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 167.
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testimony, and once the committee had left, he asked the court stenographer to add a 
sentence to this statement, saying, “I have since changed my opinion; I believe John 
Brown to be the representative man of this century.” 106 In this way he would not be 
implicated in the raid, but he could nevertheless express his respect and admiration for 
his Kansas friend.
After the raid, Steams continued to work for emancipation and civil rights,
+Vispearheading the organization of free black regiments, including the 54 Massachusetts. 
In 1863, when Secretary of War Edwin Stanton approached Steams about overseeing 
black recruiting, Steams insisted that he would only oblige if  black soldiers “enter the 
service of the government on the same terms as the white soldiers, the same pay; same 
rations, [and] same equipment.”107 Stanton agreed to these stipulations. Steams would 
accept nothing less than complete equality for all his soldiers—black or white.108
Furthermore, during the early years of Reconstruction, Steams and other 
abolitionists, including Wendell Phillips, believed that the American Anti-Slavery 
Society should continue to work in behalf of blacks by ensuring that newly freed slaves 
were granted civil rights. Abolitionists were divided over this issue, as Garrison and 
some of his colleagues believed that free blacks, not Northern abolitionists, should bear 
this responsibility. Clearly Steams had a deep commitment to civil rights, as he 
continued in the cause until his death in 1867.109
106 Steams, Report o f  the Select Committee, 242.
107 Sketch o f George Luther Steams, Robert A. Bell Post Record Book, Richard J. Hinton Papers, Kansas 
State Historical Society, Topeka.
108 Frank Preston Steams, The Life and Public Services o f  George Luther Stearns (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott, 1907; repr.. New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969), 330.
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Franklin Sanborn, whose duties as a schoolteacher were becoming more time- 
consuming, did not continue to support violence publicly. But privately, at least, he was 
proud of his involvement with Brown’s raid. On December 1, the day before Brown’s 
execution, Sanborn admitted that “I have never for a moment regretted my connection 
with the affair. If my name is to be remembered at all in it, it will be in an honorable 
way.” 110 He did help to organize an “Impartial Suffrage League” in 1865, along with 
Samuel Howe.111 Sanborn also actively sought to perpetuate the story of Brown, editing 
the Life and Letters o f  John Brown and writing various articles and reminiscences of the 
raid. By expressing admiration for his friend and mentor, he subtly demonstrated his 
faith in Brown’s actions at Harper’s Ferry.
Gerrit Smith continuously denied any previous knowledge of the raid and 
removed himself from the abolitionist movement. He claimed that he had occasionally 
given Brown money, but that he had not known the plans for Harper’s Ferry. He refused 
to even discuss the matter, claiming his bout with insanity had blurred his memory and 
led to extreme agitation whenever the topic was introduced into conversation. He
117virtually retired from public life, spending his time at home with family. Out of all the 
Six, he was the most adamant in his denunciation. Ralph Harlow, one of Smith’s 
biographers, maintains that although there is no proof against his insanity, “it is 
significant that he forgot apparently nothing else of consequence during that period, and 
that he was still destroying evidence as late as June, 1860, a procedure suggestive of 
neither ignorance nor innocence.”113
110 Sanborn, Recollections, 1:221.
111 Ralph Volney Harlow, Gerrit Smith: Philanthropist and Reformer (New York: Henry Holt, 1939), 444.
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The Harper’s Ferry raid certainly exacerbated the tensions that had already 
existed between North and South, but what is even more telling is its effect on the 
abolitionist movement. Public opinion in the North had moved closer toward an 
acceptance of anti-slavery ideas, particularly after Brown’s eloquent pleas for black 
emancipation, but by no means was the North of one mind on the slavery issue.
However, abolitionists had smoothed out some of their own differences—virtually 
everyone, including those who did not believe in violent means, applauded Brown’s 
intentions at Harper’s Ferry. At the very least, abolitionists became more intimately 
acquainted with the idea of militancy, grudgingly recognizing its ability to create a 
widespread sentiment against slavery. Inspired by Brown’s actions at Harper’s Ferry, 
and spurred onward by the altered nature of the sectional conflict, abolitionists continued 
to work toward emancipation and civil rights for the enslaved.
CONCLUSION
“The whole h istory o f  the p ro g ress  o f  human liberty show s that a ll concessions y e t m ade to her 
august claims, have been b o m  o f  earnest s tru g g le .... I f  there is no struggle there is no
progress. ” F rederick  D ouglass, 1857
The tentative balancing act of sectional relations in the United States toppled as 
Northerners and Southerners planted their feet firmly against each other through their 
responses to the Harper’s Ferry raid. Although many Northerners had initially deplored 
the assault on Harper’s Ferry, John Brown’s statements during his trial and his conduct 
on the gallows led many to sound a chorus of approval for his selflessness, courage, and 
heroism in behalf of his enslaved brethren. Witnessing the changing tide of public 
opinion that washed over the North, Southerners felt betrayed by their fellow citizens 
who had shown more sympathy for a man the white South viewed as a crazed fanatic 
than they had shown for their Southern countrymen. To many, a peaceful union 
between these two sections of the country now seemed impossible.
Naturally, the raid’s outcome and American society’s increased polarization 
deeply affected those who had been closest to Brown. The Secret Six had played a vital 
role within the abolitionist movement prior to the raid. Before 1859, all of the Six had 
tirelessly labored for emancipation—harboring fugitive slaves, preaching sermons, 
aiding free Northern blacks, and making speeches to further the abolitionist cause.
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They also realized that Kansas was in the midst of its own civil war, and Samuel Howe, 
Thomas Higginson, Franklin Sanborn, and George Steams in particular were involved 
in sending arms to free-state settlers in the territory.
Due to their contact with fugitive slaves and their interactions with free-state 
settlers, it becomes clear that the Six had embraced violent abolitionism before they met 
Brown in 1857, concluding that political and moral suasion had to be supplemented by 
more aggressive tactics. Their anti-slavery work prior to the raid had primed them for 
the violent action Brown took in Virginia. In contrast to Jeffery Rossbach’s 
conclusions, the Six were not “ambivalent conspirators.” They did have certain doubts 
about this particular mission, especially after Hugh Forbes’s betrayal, but they were not 
wary of violent means before the raid; some hesitated to use violence only after the 
dramatic events of 1859. The Six condoned violence because they had seen how 
slavery treated blacks—they heard it in the words of fugitives and saw it through their 
scars. For the Six, as well as many other abolitionists, non-resistance had lost its 
authority—although these lofty principles were honored in theory, few 
accomplishments could be attributed to moral persuasion.1
Since the raid obviously did not alter the institution of slavery, the Six’s 
understanding o f its evil nature lived on regardless of Brown’s death. Consequently, 
their attitudes toward violence did not change because the nature of slavery remained 
the same. Most of the Six (excluding Gerrit Smith) still spoke favorably of the raid and 
its violent methods, or at least admired Brown’s role in the insurrection. Granted, some
1 Merton L. Dillon, Slavery Attacked: Southern Slaves and Their Allies, 1619-1865 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 225. Dillon goes on to say: “Moral suasion remained useful for 
creating a public opinion favorable to reform, but after minds had been changed, an entrenched old order 
still must be overthrown before the new order could take its place” (226).
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of them were not as forthcoming and supportive as Thomas Higginson would have 
liked, caring more for their personal lives and reputations than the abolitionist cause.
The raid certainly forced them to be less comfortable with violence—now that they had 
seen its far-reaching effect on the nation, they struggled to reconcile their faith in 
violent means with the reality of its consequences. After Harper’s Ferry, the Six shied 
away from entering into public debates over violent means, astutely avoiding the topic. 
In this way their attitudes toward violence did fluctuate-—violent means were no longer 
something to broadcast publicly. They may have still advocated violence, but now they 
sought to keep a low profile, partly as a response to anti-abolition sentiment that had 
appeared in the North.2 Furthermore, as the secession crisis garnered national attention, 
militant abolitionism receded into the background and the Six’s silence on the subject of 
violent means may have simply reflected this shift.3
Historians such as Edward Renahan and Jeffery Rossbach agree that the Six 
pulled away from violent means after the raid, but neither of them distinguishes 
between the Six’s actions (pulling away from violent tactics in self-defense), and the 
Six’s beliefs (continuing to support violence). This, I would argue, is a pivotal 
distinction. In the case of the Six, it appears that their beliefs remained constant, even 
though their actions were sometimes unfaithful to those convictions. Thomas 
Higginson and Theodore Parker (who died in early 1860) publicly maintained their 
acceptance of violence and demonstrated the greatest consistency. Gerrit Smith
2 While the raid did rally the North, some Northerners feared the consequences o f a large tree black 
population and opposed abolitionism because o f perceived social and economic problems that might 
result. However, these same anti-abolitionists were not necessarily pro-South.
3 With civil war hovering on the horizon, the plight o f the slave was only one o f several reasons to attack 
Southern interests. The national presidential election o f 1860 had created quite a stir, and Southerners 
declared that they would not support Lincoln’s presidency. Thus, the North’s attention had turned to 
threats o f secession and armed conflict, so emancipation had to share the spotlight with other issues.
77
suffered a nervous breakdown and denied all accusations that he helped fund the raid. 
His adamant denunciation of Brown’s actions sets him apart from the rest. The last 
three members of the Six, Franklin Sanborn, Samuel Howe, and George Stearns, tried to 
walk a fine line by denying direct involvement in the raid but continuing to laud Brown 
as a hero. Furthermore, all three of them fled to Canada to avoid any punitive action 
that might result from their involvement. Since each of these men felt guilty later about 
his reactions to the raid, it would seem that they recognized their inconsistency. By 
showing support for John Brown and his raid on Harper’s Ferry, even while denying 
complicity, five members of the Six (not including Smith) demonstrated their 
conviction that slavery would fall by the sword.
In general, the Secret Six did not believe the raid was a failure. Even if Brown 
did not free slaves, his violent attack fostered a state of panic throughout the South. 
Higginson quickly saw the benefits that would come from the raid’s apparent failure, 
believing it would “frighten and weaken the slave power everywhere.”4 Sanborn also 
believed that “the fruits of Brown’s acts are to be a great good, I have no doubt.”5
Out of all the Six, Theodore Parker made the most profound statements about 
the far-reaching implications of the raid. He believed that “it shows the weakness of the 
greatest Slave State in America, the worthlessness of her soldiery, and the utter fear 
which Slavery genders in the bosoms of the masters.”6 These men clearly saw the 
benefits of violence. But while their attitudes toward violence did not change
4 [Thomas Wentworth Higginson], Letters and Journals o f  Thomas Wentworth Higginson, 1846-1906 ed. 
Mary Thatcher Higginson (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1921; repr., New York: Negro Universities 
Press, 1969), 87.
5 F[ranklin] B. Sanborn, Recollections o f Seventy Years (Boston: Gorham Press, 1909), 1:221.
6 [Theodore Parker], John Brown’s Expedition Reviewed in a letter from Rev. Theodore Parker, at Rome, 
to Francis Jackson, Boston {Boston. The Fraternity, 1860), 18.
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dramatically, how did their understanding of their role in the abolitionist cause develop 
and mature after the failure of the Harper’s Ferry raid?
I argue that their understanding of their role in abolition was modified because 
the very nature of abolitionism was in flux. The Six still realized that they could make a 
difference in the fight against slavery, but the rules of the game had changed. The 
mentality o f the nation was not the same as it had been in the years and months before 
the raid—Harper’s Ferry was a watershed in the nation’s history. Thus, most of the Six 
believed that they still had a role to play in abolitionism, even if that role was not yet 
defined.
Even though the North was becoming a more favorable environment for 
abolitionism to thrive, this did not mean that radical violence was overwhelmingly 
supported; Northerners who lauded Brown as a hero did not necessarily endorse his 
means of attacking the South. As a result, radicals like the Six often became more 
marginalized after the raid. For instance, George Steams was ostracized by his former 
business associates because of his alliance with Brown. The Secret Six still found 
support from other radicals and from transcendentalists like Henry David Thoreau and 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, but the tensions in American society, which were being 
expressed on both sides of the slavery question, forced them to be cautious about openly 
expressing militant abolitionist beliefs.
Because they remained aware of slavery’s debilitating effects on the Southern 
black population, most of the Six continued to support emancipation and civil rights 
even after an apparent failure at Harper’s Ferry. Brown may have become a martyr 
(and catalyst for civil conflict) but in practical terms no slaves were directly freed. This
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unshakable commitment reveals how radical abolitionists adapted their views and 
techniques after a failed attempt at emancipating slaves; they continued laboring, 
despite failures, until emancipation was finally realized. Although the historiography of 
the early twentieth century painted a very negative portrait o f abolitionists—speaking of 
them as unstable fanatics with no real understanding of slavery—the Six are proof 
against such an assertion. Regardless of their imperfections, abolitionists believed in a 
degree of racial equality that raises them up as an example of men with forward- 
thinking convictions that was virtually unparalleled during the antebellum period.
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